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CONSIDERATION AND CONTROL OF COMMERCIAL CON-
DITIONS IN RAILROAD RATE REGULATION
THE power to fix railroad rates has been described as the power
to convert a wilderness into a city or a city into a wilderness.1
Before the development of government rate regulation, the uncon-
trolled managerial policies of the railroads, dictated by self-inter-
est and the exigencies of competition, created a rate structure to
which our industrial system has necessarily adjusted itself." By
virtue of its authority to modify this structure-to alter the
face of our rate geography-the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion has the incidental power to influence the economic destinies
of competing localities. The exercise of this power is of course
open to attack as a perversion of the commerce clause of the
constitution to effect the control of industrial conditions within
the states.3 Perhaps to silence this constitutional objection, as
well as to prevent the abuse of rate regulation, the doctrine has
developed that the Commission should formulate, its rate deci-
sions primarily upon consideration of transportation rather
than commercial conditions. 4 By approving the doctrine and
viewirig its disregard as reversible error, the Federal Courts
-BEALE AND WYMAN, RAILROAD RATE REGULATION (2d ed. 1915) 657,.
2A. B. STICKNEY, THE RAILWAY PROBLEM (1891) c. 6 and 7; JONES AND
VANDERBLUE, RAILROADS, CASES AND SELECTIONS (1925) c. 8; VANDERBLI
AND BURGESS, RAILROADS, RATES, SERVICE, MANAGEMENT (1923) c. 5.
3 Cf. Brief of Intervenors at p. 61 in Texas & Pacific Ry. v. United
States, 42 F. (2d) 281 (S. D. Tex. 1930); Brief of Appellant at p. 160
et seq. in Ann Arbor R.R. v. United States, 30 F. (2d) 940 (N. D. Cal.
1928), citing Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct. 529 (1918),
and Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277 (1908).
4 The Commission has endorsed this principle at various times in state-
ments such as the following: "It seems unnecessary here to state that
the power has not been lodged with this tribunal to equalize economic ad-
vantages, to put one market in competition with another, or to treat all
the railroads as part of one great whole." Ashland Fire Brick Co. v.
Southern Ry., 22 I. C. C. 115, 121 (1911). "We are really being asked,
so far as the immediate situation is concerned to fix such rates for the
purpose of giving each refining point what we may deem to be its fair
share of the sugar business in the destination territory under considera-
tion, a purpose which considered alone, rather than as a more incident of
other purposes, clearly does not justify the use of this power." Sugar
Cases of 1922, 81 I. C. C. 448, 472 (1923).
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have established it as a judicial limitation upon the scope of
the Commission's authority.
The clarification or discard of this limitation seemed to be
necessitated by the passage in 1925 of the Hoch-Smith Resolu-
tion,6 which directed a readjustment of the rate structure of
the country "to the end that commodities may freely move."
The Commission was ordered to consider "in so far as it is
legally possible to do so" the conditions within each industry,
the trend in market value of commodities, and particularly the
existing agricultural depression. On its face the resolution ap-
peared to be a significant alteration of the Transportation Act
of 1920,7 a mandate to consider commercial conditions as they
had not been considered before. So at least it was interpreted
by the Commission in the case of California Growers' and
Skippers' Protective League v. Southern Pa cific Ry.8
The first hearing of this case, in which the complainants
asked a reduction in rates on deciduous fruits to Eastern mar-
kets, was held before the passage of the Hoch-Smith Resolu-
tion. The decision of the Commission, rendered after the
passage of the Resolution, dismissed the complaint because
neither cost nor comparative rate studies disclosed that the rates
under attack were unreasonably high. At the second hearing
the complainants supplemented this evidence of transportation
conditions with elaborate proofs of the decline in the market
value of deciduous fruits, decrease or disappearance of profits,
and heavy mortgaged indebtedness of producers. Relying con-
siderably on this new evidence of commercial conditions, consid-
ered relevant by virtue of the Hoch-Smith Resolution, the
Commission reversed its former decision and ordered substantial
5 The distinction between commercial and transportation conditions was
one of the grounds for reversal in Anchor Coal Co. v. United States, 25
F. (2d) 462 (S. D. W. Va. 1928). This decision itself was reversed on
other grounds (because the controversy had become moot) in United States
v. Anchor Coal Co., 279 U. S. 812, 49 Sup. Ct. 262 (1928). The same
distinction was at least partly responsible for the decision of the Supreme
Court in Southern Pacific Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219
U. S. 433, 31 Sup. Ct. 288 (1911). Cf. also dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice White in Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago, Rock Island
& Pacific Ry., 218 U. S. 88, 111, 30 Sup. Ct. 651, 660 (1910); Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Union Pacific R.R., 222 U. S. 541, 32 Sup. Ct.
108 (1911).
643 STAT. 801 (1925), 49 U. S. C. § 55 (1926). The significance of'
the resolution is discussed in Robinson, The Hoch-Smith. Resolution and
the Futare of the Interstate Coamwrce Commission (1929) 42 HARV. L.
REv. 610. See also WAGNER, TaE HOCH-SzurrH RESOLUTION (1929); LoCK-
LIN, RAILROAD REGULATION SINCE 1920 (1928) c. 5.
741 STAT. 456 (1920), 49 U. S. C. §§ 1, 27 (1926).




reductions in the ratesY
This order was recently set aside by the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Amn Arbor R.R. v. United States.10
The Court found that the Commission had erroneously inter-
preted the Resolution and based its decision upon factors which
were still beyond its jurisdiction. In such phrases as "in so far
as it might legally do so" and "lawful changes in the rate struc-
ture," Mr. Justice Van Devanter found sufficient indication that
Congress had intended no change in the "basic law" and in the
extent of the Commission's authority. The opinion also suggests
that grave constitutional objections might arise from any legis-
lative attempt to increase the consideration of commercial con-
ditions in rate regulation. It is with the present limits of such
consideration, which the opinion of Mr. Justice Van Devanter
does not attempt to define, that we are first concerned.
A similar problem has been explored in an attempt to discover
the part played by "value of service" in the determination of
public utility rates." It has been there suggested that cost
studies establish, not a definite rate, but a zone of reasonable-
ness within which rates may move up or down in accordance
with many other factors of public interest, all inadequately de-
scribed by the terms "value of service" or "commercial condi-
tions." Upon this theory, and without reference to the Hoch-
Smith Resolution, the Commission might possibly have recon-
ciled the two decisions in the California Growers' case.
Whether such an explanation would have been accepted as satis-
factory by the Supreme Court can hardly be discovered from
an examination of former cases, since the Commission is not
prone to admit the consideration accorded commercial conditions
in the determination of reasonable rates.
A more fruitful field of inquiry is afforded by cases involving
rate relationships between competing producers, markets, or
ports. Here the complaint usually contains, not only charges
of unreasonableness under Section 1 of the Interstate Commerce
Act, but also charges of unjust discrimination or undue prej-
udice under Section 2 or 3 of the Act.12 The great discrimina-
tion cases of the twentieth century have been really pitched
9 129 I. C. C. 25, 32, 55.
10 281 U. S. 658, 50 Sup. Ct. 444 (1930).
11 Edgerton, Value of Service as a Factor in Rate Making (1919) 32
HARv. L. Rnv. 516.
1241 STAT. 479 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 2 (1928); 41 STAT. 480 (1920), 49
U. S. C. § 3 (1928). Section 2 forbids unjust discrimination and Section
3 undue prejudice. It is only very recently that the Commission has at-
tempted to distingush between the two terms, and in this paper, as in most
of the cases here discussed, they are used interchangeably. The wording
of Section 3 is much broader than that of Section 2, and it is consequently
the former which is usually involved in the cases here considered.
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battles between the Manufacturers' Associations or Chambers
of Commerce of competing localities, sometimes widely separated
geographically, but inextricably linked economically.
II
The seeds of these cases are sown by two fundamental but con-
flicting principles of railroad ratemaking-the distance princi-
ple and the equalization principle." According to the first, rates
increase with distance, if transportation conditions are similar;
but they increase more slowly as the distance increases in order
that earnings per ton mile may remain the same. According
to the second, rates paid by competing shippers to the same
market, or by the same shippers to competing markets, tend to
equalize despite distance differences, with the result that earn-
ings per ton-mile are disparate. Equalization usually develops
from competition between carriers who are fighting for the same
business, or from the desire of one carrier to encourage busi-
ness on different parts of its line. The result may be "blanket
rates" '4 such as enable California fruit growers to reach East-
ern markets, or "proportional rates" I such as enable the col-
lecting and distributing centers of the Middle West to compete
for the same trade, or "import and export" rates 1 r such as
enable South Atlantic and Gulf ports to share in foreign traffic.
Economists defend equalization systems with three main argu-
ments: (1) they promote healthy market competition which
reacts to the benefit of the consumer; (2) they prevent
port congestion and over-centralization of population; (3) they
have worked for a long time and any radical change would be
disastrous to commercial interests which have become adjusted
to them.17
Although the Commission has recognized that a rate system
which does not adequately reflect distance differences is a poten-
- VANDERBLUE AND BURGESS, op. cit. supra note 2, at c. 9 and 10; JONEs
AND VANDERBLuE, op. cit. supra note 2, at c. 9 and 10.
- California Growers & Shippers League v. Southern Pacific Ry., supra
note 8.
-Kansas City Transportation Bureau v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Ry., 16 1. C. C. 195 (1909).
1A very recent decision of the Commission, allowing the continuance
of import and export rates to South Atlantic and Gulf ports lower than
corresponding domestic rates, in order to keep South Atlantic and Gulf
ports "more nearly on an equality" with North Atlantic ports, is partly
reported in the U. S. Daily, Jan. 7, 1931, at 3363.
17 See BEALE AND WmEAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 775; PZEFERENTmIL.
TRANSPORTATION RATES, U. S. TARIFF CODIMISSION (1922). See also VAN-
DERBLUE AND BURGESS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 156: "Alter all, considered:
in the light of the development of railroad rates and industrial centers in
the United States, a strict application of the mileage principle appears to,
be the rate making of desperation."
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tial source of discrimination, it has often approved rate ad-
justments which have been based on the equalization rather
than the distance principle.18 Sometimes the Commission has
frankly adopted the reasoning of the economists; more often it
has employed legal circumlocutions. According to one popular
form of phraseology, discrimination is not illegal unless it is
"undue," and is not undue unless actual damage is proved.1"
Such damage may be negatived by showing that the complain-
ing district has been able to meet successfully the competition
which the equalization system has developed, or has been com-
pensated for any losses by the opportunities in other fields which
equalization has affordpd. Even though actual damage has been
established, the Commission may sometimes find sufficient justi-
fication in the "self-interest" of the carrier, its desire to en-
courage new business on its own line by "missionary rates,"
or to meet the rates of other carriers at competitive points, or
on competing commodities.20
Despite its frequent approval of equalization policies volun-
tarily adopted bythe railroads, the Commission has often denied
that it has the power to take the initiative in prescribing such
rate adjustments.21  This dual attitude was clearly illustrated
in Maritime Ass'n, Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Ann Arbor
R.R.- in which Boston attempted to regain a substantial share
of the import and export traffic of the Middle West. The com-
plaint attacked as prejudicial and discriminatory a rate struc-
ture which, by equalization, deprived Boston of its distance ad-
vantages over Gulf and Canadian ports, but reflected, in port
is Supra note 16; Galveston Commercial Ass'n v. Alabama & Vicksburg
Ry., 77 I. C. C. 388 (1923) ; Oakland Chamber of Commerce v. Southern
Pacific Co., 100 I. C. C. 55 (1925).
1,9 "This to be sure is not a legal argument but the Commission is al-
ways reluctant to disturb any rate adjustment of long standing, and when
such disturbances would obviously be followed by disastrous consequences
to an important community, this reluctance is increased. In such cases
therefore the Commission will ask whether the differential is undue, and
if it is not no change will be ordered." BEATL AND WYMAN, Op. cit. su1pra
note 1, at 744. See also Newport Mining Co. v. Chicago & North Western
Ry., 33 I. C. C. 646, 657 (1915); St. Louis Chamber of Commerce v. Ala-
bama & Vicksburg Ry., 98 I. C. C. 29, 32 (1925); Bradley & Woertz V.
Illinois Central R.R., 118 I. C. C. 233, 235 (1926).
20 Mobile Chamber of Commerce v. Mobile & Ohio R.R., 57 I. C. C. 554,
559, 560 (1920); Dutton Lumber Corp. v. New York, New Haven & Hart-
ford R.R., 151 I. C. C. 391, 411 (1929); BEALE AND WYMAN, op. Cit. Supra
note 1, at § 595.
2. But if the carriers have voluntarily equalized some competitive points
and not others the Commission may order that the equalization system be
extended to include the others. Cf. Port Arthur Chamber of Commerce and
Shipping v. Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. (No. 1600, decided Dec. 4, 1930).




differentials, the geographical advantages of New York, Phila-
delphia and Baltimore. The Commission frankly sympathized
with Boston's predicament and regretted the lack of such carrier
or water competition as would induce a voluntary equalization
of the Eastern ports. It refused, however, to prescribe such an
adjustment because consideration of transportation conditions
'alone, i.e., comparative studies of cost of service and earnings
per ton mile, justified the distance differentials then in effect.
Another aspect of the conflict between the distance and equal-
ization principles is illustrated by the case of Galvcston Comizcr-
ciat Ass'n v. Galveston, Harisburg & San Antonio Ry.*-3 Galves-
ton complained of the export .and import rates on traffic to and
from Oklahoma through the ports of Galveston and New Or-
leans, which the railroads had voluntarily equalized despite the
distance advantage of Galveston. The Commission found this
adjustment unduly prejudicial because it neutralized the geo-
graphical advantage of Galveston by affording shippers to and
from New Orleans more service for the same rate. An order
which prescribed a scale of differentials for the future was
attacked on appeal as an abuse of the rate-making power to con-
trol commercial conditions. Some support for this charge may
be found both in the majority opinion of the Commission, which
is largely devoted to a discussion of port conditions, and in the
order itself, which exempted petroleum products because of
peculiar economic factors controlling their distribution. The
Federal court was content to rest the dismissal of the appeal
on the main ground that there was sufficient evidence of transpor-
tation costs to support the decision; 2- the court might have gone
further and justified the Commission's discussion of commercial •
conditions as a necessary inquiry into the damage already effected
and the possibilities of relief.
But the fundamental justification for the Galveston decision
must be sought in the economics of rate equalization. The Com-
mission found, in effect, that the raison d'Ctre of port equaliza-
tion, the promotion of healthy port competition, did not in fact
exist, because New Orleans, the beneficiary of the equalization
system, already occupied so preeminent a position that, even
without equalization, it was assured of the lion's share of Gulf
traffic. It is certainly difficult to deny that this is consideration
of commercial conditions; but it is more difficult to conceive of
an intelligent decision without such consideration. So long as
equalization is conceded a legitimate place in our rate structure,
the Commission will often be called upon to choose between an
approval of equalized rates and insistence upon the strict appli-
23 100 I. C. C. 110 (first decision, 1925) ; 128 I. C. C. 349 (second deci-
sion, 1927); 160 I. C. C. 345 (third decision, 1929).
24 Texas & Pacific Ry. v. United States, 42 F. (2d) 281 (S. D. Tex. 1930).
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cation of the distance principle. In making that primary choice,
cost studies can be of little aid. And even if the distance prin-
ciple be chosen, the Commission may find it necessary to allow
some sway to equalization influences lest industrial adjustments
be too radically disturbed.2. Whatever be the decision in the par-
ticular case, commercial destinies are certain to be affected; and
the only guarantee of a wise decision is a thorough evaluation'
of the economic factors involved.
III
In the discrimination cases which come before the Commission,
the problem of control and consideration of commercial condi-
tions does not often appear in the simplified form so far dis-
cussed. Usually it is complicated and confused by narrower legal
issues concerning the scope of authority conferred by the Inter-
state Commerce Act 26 and the interpretation of changes wrought
therein by the Transportation Act of 1920. In the Boston Cham-
ber of Commerce case, for example, the Commission not only
refused to prescribe equalization of the Eastern ports, but also
found its power under Section 3 insufficient to prescribe a differ-
ential scale between Boston and Gulf ports, because rates from
the Middle West to New England and the Gulf were not con-
trolled by the same carriers. In the Galveston case, however,
both the Commission and the Federal court overruled the con-
tention of the Texas & Pacific and the Louisiana & Arkansas
railways that they were not subject to a finding of undue preju-
dice since they served only New Orleans and not Galveston.
The basis for the decision in the Boston Chamber of Commerce
case and 'the unsuccessful contention of the railroads in the
Galveston case is known as the doctrine of the Ashland Fire
Brick case. The rule as then stated by the Commission was:
"The test of discrimination is the ability of one of the carriers
. .. to put an end to the discrimination by its own act." 27 In
subsequent cases this has been interpreted to mean that the
same carrieiz must control both the preferential and prejudicial
rates, so that it may have the alternative power of terminating
the discrimination by either raising the preferential rates or
lowering the prejudicial rate.28
25 Thus, in'the Galveston Case, supra note 23, equalization was allowed
where the distance to New Orleans did not exceed by more than 25/o
the distance to Galveston. Equalization was also allowed on petroleum
products after the second hearing. 128 I. C. C. 349. Cf. City of Astoria
v. Spokane, Portland, & Seattle Ry., 38 I. C. C. 16 (1916); Inland Em-
pire Shippers League v. Director General, 59 I. C. C. 321 (1920).
2624 STAT. 379 (1887), 49 U. S. C. §§ 1, 27 (1928).
27 Ashland Fire Brick Co. v. Southern Ry., supra hote 4, at 120.
28 Allen Mfg. Co. v. Alabama & Great Southern R.R., 126 1. C. C. 515,
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But the determination of whether the same carrier does in
fact control both rates is not, in an inferlocking system of
through routes and joint rates, always free from difficulty. It
seems quite definitely established that when traffic from differ-
ent localities to the same destination is originated by different
carriers but delivered by the same carrier, the latter "controls"
both rates by virtue of its strategic position.- When traffic is
originated by the same carrier and delivered by different carriers
to different destinations, the question of "control" is less cer-
tain. This last set-up, resembles somewhat the situation in the
Galveston case. But the New Orleans carriers originated only
part of the traffic between Oklahoma and Galveston, and the
Commission found that they were in fact unable to control the
rate level to Galveston.30 It was then suggested that a finding
of undue prejudice could be based upon the fact that the Alis-
souri & Pacific owned the controlling stock in both the New
Orleans and Galveston roads. This solution was also rejected
because the Missouri & Pacific did not use its stock ownership
to direct the managerial policies of its subsidiaries.0
In its final decision, the Commission surmounted all these
difficulties by repudiating the doctrine of the Ashland Fire Brick
case as too narrow an interpretation of Section 3." For this
about-face there is some equivocal support in the decisions of the
Supreme Court. In St. Louis, Soutl Western Ry. V. Unitcd
States,33 the court approved a finding of undue prejudice against
a carrier which served only the preferred locality. The per-
suasive force of this decision is weakened because the Commis-
sion tried to remove the prejudice by using its power under
Section 15 to establish maximum rates instead of using its Sec-
tion 3 power to prescribe rate relationships. In UZitcd States
v. Illinois Central R.R.3 the Supreme Court approved a finding
of undue prejudice against a carrier which reached only the
complaining locality. This case too may be partly explained
away, because the principal defendant was the delivering car-
rier which controlled both the preferential and prejudicial rates.
These decisions certainly support the ground upon which the
Federal court disposed of the problem in the Galveston case, i.e.,
that the offending carrier need not reach both the preferred and
prejudiced locality; they are not, however, necessarily incon-
518 (1927) ; Hallsboro Mfg. Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 157 I. C. C.
124, 128 (1929).
29 Lake Dock Coal Cases, 89 I. C. C. 170, 185 (1924).
- 128 1. C. C. 349, 381, 160 I. C. C. 345, 356.
31 128 I. C. C. 349, 380. See also the concurring opinion of Commis-
sioner Eastman, 160 I. C. C. 360.
32 160 1. C. C. 345, 358.
245 U. S. 136, 38 Sup. Ct. 49 (1917).
3 263 U. S. 515, 44 Sup. Ct. 189 (1924).
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sistent with the proposition that the same carriers must control
both the preferential and prejudicial rates.
In place of control of both rates the Commission now seems
disposed to accept either participation in both rates or control
of only one of the rates. In either case there is lacking the al-
ternative power to remove the discrimination by raising the
preferential rate or lowering the prejudicial rate. Thus the or-
der of the Commission in the Galveston case apparently operated
to force the New Orleans carriers to raise their rates. This is
in effect similar to the operation of a minimum rate order. It
has accordingly been suggested that necessity for the doctrine
of the Ashland Fire Brick case existed when the Commission
did not have power to establish minimum rates, but that the
reason for the rule has been dead since the grant of the mini-
mum rate power in the Transportation Act of 1920.3 Against
this argument there is one outstanding authority. The case of
Central Railroad of New Jersey v. United States involved the
question of discrimination in transportation privileges, but the
following words of Mr. Justice Brandeis seem equally applic-
able to rate cases under Section 3: "What Congress sought to
prevent by that section as originally enacted was not differences
between localities in transportation rates, facilities and privileges,
but unjust discrimination between them by the same carrier or
carriers. Neither the Transportation Act of 1920 nor any earlier
amendatory legislation has changed in that respect the purpose
or scope of Section 3." 11
Another problem which often mingles with consideration
of commercial conditions is the true "purpose or scope" of
the minimum rate making power. That this power may
be as effective an instrument as Section 3 in re-making rate
geography has been demonstrated by some of the most dramatic
cases of the last decade. The Sugar Cases of 1922 31 developed
from the struggle between the Atlantic seaboard, Louisiana and
California refiners for the Chicago market. Boston and New
York shippers complained of a rate structure which reflected
in differentials the distance advantages of their eastern competi-
tors, but neutralized by competitive rates the geographical dis-
advantages of Louisiana and California competitors. The com-
plainants asked in effect that either the equalization or the dis-
tance principle be consistently applied, so that competitors would
all enter the Chicago market on an equal footing or would all
3 5See concurring opinion of Commissioner Eastman in Lake Cargo Coal
Rates, 1925, 126 I. C. C. 367, 371 (1927). Commissioner Eastman ad-
vocates concurrent use of the power under Section 3 and the minimum
rate power when one carrier serves both points but is forced to lower
the rates at one of the points because of the competition of other carriers.
36 257 U. S. 247, 259, 42 Sup. Ct. 80, 83 (1921).
3T81 I. C. C. 448 (1923).
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have the benefit of their geographical advantages. The Com-
mission found that the eastern rates were not so high as to war-
rant a maximum rate order nor the Louisiana or California rates
so low as to be non-compensatory, but that the relationship be-
tween the rates was not justified by transportation conditions.
There was, however, according to the prevailing philosophy of
the Commission, no adequate basis for a finding of undue preju-
dice under Section 3 because the preferential and prejudicial
rates were controlled by different carriers. In lieu of an order
under Section 3, dissenting Commissioner Campbell advocated a
minimum rate order which would remove the prejudice by rais-
ing the Louisiana and California rates. This use of the mini-
mum rate power to cure the evils aimed at in Section 3 the major-
ity rejected as an abuse of rate regulation to control commercial
conditions.
The Salut Cases of 1923 "1 present a similar situation with a
very different result. Producers in Ohio and New York com-
plained of preferential rates enjoyed by Kansas and Louisiana
competitors in the Chicago market. Here again the Commission
found that the prejudicial rates were not so high as to be un-
reasonable nor the preferential rates so low as to be non-com-
pensatory but that the relationship between the two was unjusti-
fied by transportation conditions. There was no "adequate basis"
for a finding under Section 3 because the rates were controlled
by different carriers; nevertheless the prejudice complained of
was in fact removed and a differential system effected by pre-
scribing minimum rates from all the competing localities. These
orders were defended by the Commission as necessary to prevent
a ruinous rate war between the carriers; they were attacked on
appeal by Louisiana producers as an abuse of power on the
ground that minimum rate orders were justified only when the
previous rates were found to be non-compensatory. The Federal
court in affirming the decision adopted an even more liberal at-
titude than the Commission, holding that the minimum rate
power could be properly used either to prevent rate wars or to
remove discrimination between localities.2 This seems not only
a reasonable but even a literal interpretation of Section 15 (1)
of the Interstate Commerce Act which provides that "whenever
... the Commission shall be of the opinion that any individual or
joint rate . . . is or will be unjust or unreasonable or unjustly
discriminatory or unduly preferential or prejudicial.., the Com-
mission is authorized and empowered to determine and prescribe
what will be the just and reasonable individual or joint rate...
- 92 I. C. C. 388 (1924).
39 Jefferson Island Salt Mining Co. v. United States, 6 F. (2d) 375
(N. D. Ohio 1925).
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or the maximum or minimum, or maximum and minimum, to be
*charged."
The purpose and scope of this Section and its relation to Sec-
tion 3 were subjected to an acid test in the famous Lake Cargo
Coal Cases of 1925,40 which developed from competition between
Ohio and Pennsylvania coal operators on the one hand and Ken-
tucky and West Virginia coal operators on the other. The rates
under attack moved coal from the mines to ports on the Great
Lakes whence it was transported by water on its way to the mar-
kets of the middle west. The northern producers complained
that their own rates were too high and those of their southern
competitors too low; that the relationship between the rates was
unjust and the northern coal industry being ruined in conse-
quence. To the complainants' principal witness was put the
following question: "This case then is really a commercial fight
between your districts against West Virginia and Kentucky and
is not a rate case, is it?" The witness frankly replied, "Any rate
case I ever heard of was a commercial fight and this is just like
the rest of them." 41
At the first hearing the Commission found that the northern
rates were not unreasonably high or the southern rates unreason-
ably low. Undue prejudice was charged on the ground that the
differential system, although involving Jigher rates to the south
did not adequately reflect differences in distance and cost of
transportation. Since the rates were not controlled by the same
carriers this plea was also refused and the entire complaint dis-
missed. At the second hearing held after the passage of the
Hoch-Smith Regolution, the Commission seemed to lend a more
sympathetic ear to the description of depression and unemploy-
ment in the northern mines and to comparative cost studies pur-
porting to show that the northern rates were earning more per
ton-mile than the southern rates. The result was a maximum
rate order which lowered the northern rates, thus increasing the
differentials to a point where, in the opinion of the Commission,
they adequately reflected differences in transportation costs. But
the triumph of the rorthern operators was not yet assured; the
southern carriers imiediately tried to reestablish the old differ-
entials by publishing corresponding reductions in the southern
rates. At the third hearing the Commission found that the car-
riers had not justified their reductions by showing that the dif-
ferentials established by the Commission were unfair and at-
tempted to close the case with a minimum rate order which
restored the southern rates to their former level.
40 101 I. C. C. 513 (first decision, 1925); 126 1. C. C. 309 (second de-
cision, 1927); 139 I. C. C. 367 (third decision, 1928).
"See 101 I. C. C. 513, 541.
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The end was not yet, for the Federal Court in Anclwr Coal Co.
v. United States42 set aside the order of the Commission. Judge
Parker enthusiastically elaborated the proposition that the Com-
mission had exceeded its powers, "in that its action was based
in part at least upon industrial conditions and was essentially
an effort to equalize industrial conditions and offset economic
advantages through adjustment of rates." The opinion proceeds
on the theories that "in competitive adjustments carriers may
disregard distance even in substantial degree, so long as the com-
petitor whose geographical location is largely disregarded is not
injured thereby;" and that "a rate relationship cannot be in-
jurious to a community, when the rate which that community
enjoys is lower than the rate from a competing community with
which it is compared." If this last argument be sound it applies
as well to all equalized rates and the Commission is left power-
less to preserve the benefit of geographical advantages. By such
doubtful logic Judge Parker only weakened the force of his ar-
gument which seems to rest more firmly upon the ground, often
implied though never explicit in the opinion, that the Commis-
sion had erred in calling upon its minimum rate maling power
to pinch hit for Section 3 when the latter was unavailable. Upon
this still doubtful point there is no more conclusive authority,
for when the Lake Cargo controversy reached the Supreme Court
the carriers had arrived at a compromise and the case was dis-
missed as moot. 3
The Lake Cargo Coal cases developed another issue of inter-
pretation which seems worthy of consideration. The problem
concerns Section'l (5) of the Interstate Commerce Act which
provides that "All charges made for any service rendered ...
in the transportation of person or property.., shall be just and
reasonable and every unjust and unreasonable charge for such
service or any part thereof is prohibited and declared to be un-
lawful." Upon the key words "just and reasonable" Commis-
sioner Taylor, in concurring opinions in the second and third
Lake Cargo cases, developed a theory of "relative unreasonable-
ness" to justify both the minimum and maximum rate orders
which were issued." The essence of the argument seems to be
that the justice of a rate depends not so much upon its reason-
ableness per se-as approximately determined by cost studies
and comparative rate studies-but upon its relationship to other
rates on competing traffic; that Section 15 (1) is therefore suf-
ficient authorization for the use of maximum and minimum rate
orders to establish differentials which adequately reflect geo-
graphical advantages. To this application of the theory Coin-
- Supra note 5.
43 Ibid.
-See 126 1. C. C. 309, 365; 139 1. C. C. 367, 403.
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missioner Eastman entered a caveat because "the net result...
is to extend the principles of Section 3 to situations where the
same carrier or carriers are not involved." 4 Comparative rate
studies have always been important in determining maximum
reasonableness; but Commissioner Eastman distinguishes be-
tween their proper consideration as evidence of the "intrinsic
unreasonableness" of the rates under attack, and their improper
consideration as proof of injustice. Whatever be the merits of
this somewhat metaphysical distinction, the doctrine of "relative
unreasonableness" appears to be of growing importance in rate
regulation.
An example of what Commissioner Eastman considered its
proper application is provided by the case of Chemical Lime Co.
v. Bellefonte Central R, R.46 Here the complainants, situated
on an independentconnection of the Pennsylvania Railroad, paid
a joint rate which was higher than the rates enjoyed by competi-
tors situated on the Pennsylvania but within the same general
area-the Baltimore rate group. Whether there was "adequate
basis" for a finding of undue prejudice is uncertain, for the
majority of the Commission evaded the question by finding that
"the interstate rates herein assailed ... are and for the future
will be unjust and unreasonable to the extent that they exceed
or may exceed those contemporaneously applicable on like com-
modities to Bellefonte, Pa."-a point on the Pennsylvania line
and within the Baltimore Rate Group. The opinion of the Com-
mission makes no pretense of a finding of intrinsic unreasonable-
ness, and Commissioner Eastman in his concurring opinion
makes this significant statement: "And in a case like that which
is now under consideration, where the complaining community
had rates which stood up like a pinnacle in the midst of a prairie
land of blanket rates surrounding it for many miles, we are
warranted in finding it unjust and unreasonable not to maintain
the blanket rates to the complaining community for the future,
even if we are unable on the record to determine whether or not
those blanket rates in all cases or in any case have the attributes
of maximum reasonableness." 47
Even from this use of "relative unreasonableness" several
commissioners dissented because it involved a confusion of Sec-
tions 1 and 3.48 For this position there is some support in an
early Federal case which reversed a similar decision of the Com-
mission because it embodied an ill-considered Section 3 order
45 See 139 I. C. C. 395, 396.
4, 136 I. C. C. 333 (first decision, 1927); 147 I. C. C. 285 (second de-
cision, 1928).
47 See 147 I. C. C. at 288.
48 See 136 1. C. C. at 342; 147 I. C. C. at 289.
[Vol. 40
COMMENTS
masquerading under the form of a maximum rate order.49 But
this seems to be no longer good law, for in Virginia Ry. v.
United States :o the Supreme Court approved the Commissioner's
finding that through rates over the Virginian and Chesapeake
& Ohio from the New River mining district to the west would
be unreasonable to the extent that they exceeded rates over the
Norfolk & Western from competing mines in the Outer Cres-
cent district to the same destinations. It seems that the Court
might well have found that this was in effect a Section 3 order
which was unjustified because the rates were controlled by dif-
ferent carriers; instead the Court dodged the issue by saying:
"The finding of reasonableness, like that of undue prejudice,
is a determination of fact by a tribunal informed by experience.
This Court has no concern with the correctness of the Commis-
sion's reasoning, with the soundness of its conclusions, or with
the alleged inconsistency with findings made in other proceed-
ings before it." -1 Again in Chicago, Rock Islanid & Pacific Ry.
v. United States 52 the Supreme Court approved a similar order
without any apparent appreciation of the conflict within the
Commission. Thus, whether unconsciously or deliberately, the
Supreme Court has sustained the partial usurpation of the func-
tions of Section 3 by the doctrine of "relative unreasonableness."
IV
So along three tortuous paths the Commission has been extend-
ing during the last decade its power to control rate relation-
ships. By the repudiation of the doctrine of the Ashland Fire
Brick case it has shown a disposition to escape from the tradi-
tional limitations of Section 3; in the use of the minimum rate
power, supplemented when necessary by maximum rate orders,
it has tried to develop a substitute for the orthodox method of
prescribing differentials; by the ingenious device of establish-
ing one rate as the reasonable maximum of another it has ef-
fected a convenient means of equalizing the two. All of these
developments appear to have ample justification in the broad
wording of Section 15 (1) ; but that section, like most amendatory
legislation, may be narrowed in scope by an historical, rather
than a natural, interpretation.
The Supreme Court has shown little disposition to discuss
these problems in the light of their real significance; but happy
phrases scattered occasionally through the opinions of the com-
- Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville .R., 73
Fed. 409 (C. C. Mi. D. Tenn., 1896).
- 272 U. S. 658, 47 Sup. Ct. 222 (1926), affirming Wyoming Coal Co. v.
Virginian Ry., 98 I. C. C. 488 (1925).
51 Supra note 50 at 665, 47 Sup. Ct. at 225.
5,2 74 U. S. 29, 47 Sup. Ct. 486 (1927).
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missioners reveal an underlying conflict in the philosophy of
railroad regulation. Oommissioner Campbell, in his dissenting
opinion advocating a minimum rate order in the Sugar Cases of
1922, elaborated the thesis that since the Transportation Act of
1920 the railroads should be regarded "collectively" rather than
"individually;" that it was wasteful to allow western carriers
to serve markets which eastern carriers could adequately serve
at prices just as low but with greater profits. 3 Ex-commissioner
Woodlock, on the other hand, has expressed his belief "that
competition is a cardinal principle in the whole affair;" that
"that which would be unlawful because discriminatory under a
'national' system composed of one carrier, becomes a necessary
element of competition under a 'national' system composed of
many individual carriers." " It is also in Mr. Woodlock's state-
ment, "Hands off management is the very soul of the law," r
that we find the fundamental objection to minimum rate orders,
which control the railroad manager's opportunity to increase
his business by shrewdly arranging his rates. So too, the maxi-
mum rate order in the second Lake Cargo case was regarded by
Commissioner Hall, with whom concurred Commissioner Wood-
lock, as an unwarranted interference with the functions of
management, an attempt by the Commission to set itself up as
a "special providence" regulating the destinies of men." But
53 Commissioner Campbell has expressed his liberal philosophy of rate
regulation in statements such as the following: "In fixing reasonable
minimum rates I think that we must consider in each case whether the
rate would be so low as to cast a burden on other traffic; whether it would
be lower than necessary for the purposes intended; whether it would be
unjustly discriminatory or unduly prejudicial; whether in its effect it
would be in consonance with the fundamentals, intendments, and purposes
underlying the various provisions of the transportation act, particularly
sections 15 (a) and 500; and whether under all the circumstances and con-
ditions and in the light of the transportation act as a whole, the rate
structure is reasonable, is compatible with the public interest, and accords
with established national policies. These are all questions of fact that
are within our province." Sugar Cases of 1922, supra note 4, at 417.
54 Wall St. J., Sept. 26, 1930, at 1 (articles by Mr. Woodlock when no
longer a member of the Commission). He went on to say: "Furthermore
in one or two other parts of the law, particularly in Section 15 f4) which
protects the carrier in its long haul it is necessary to remember that if
reliance is to be placed upon private enterprise operating competitive car-
riers, incentives necessary to private enterprise, conditions necessary to
keep these incentives in full play must be preserved as fully as possible.
We cannot have a successful hybrid between private enterprise and govern-
ment operation-it must be one thing or the other." See also Commissioner
Woodlock's dissenting opinion in Duluth Chamber of Commerce v. Chicago
& North Western Ry., 156 I. C. C. 156, 170 (1929).
55 Wall St. J., Sept. 24, 1930, ab 1.
56 126 I. C. C. 374, 386. "The essence of the transportation act is reg-
ulation and not management. That act was not a general reform act
giving us powers to redistribute the business or wealth of individuals or
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to Commissioner Taylor, who approved of the order, it seemed
"unthinkable . . . that the right of any commodity, or of any
locality to enjoy any of its advantages of transportation con-
ditions or geographical position should be left to the whim or
self-interest of either the carrier or carriers providing the trans-
portation facilities." 5- Thus between those who favor all or
any of the liberalizing tendencies here discussed and those who
quite consistently oppose them,-'8 there appears a fault-line which
separates the individualist from the collectivist, the advocates
of less-interference with railroad management from the friends
of closer regulation.
It is perhaps through the distinction thus developed between
the sphere of management and the sphere of regulation that
the various elements of the problem of commercial conditions
are most sharply focussed."' Certainly it must be conceded that
commercial factors play no small part in the railroad manager's
determination of his rates. He is of course interested in al-
locating his charges so that each commodity will bear its share
of the costs of operation. But even should he accept this as a
sole criterion, the presence of overhead as well as "out-of-
pocket" costs necessitates a wide margin of error. Furthermore
he must always remain conscious that his rates cannot be profit-
able unless they "move the traffic;" that lower rates may be
more profitable because more traffic will move under them. He
may even find it worthwhile to initiate "missionary" rates, -ith
the hope of encouraging infant industries which will be able
to sustain higher rates in the future. So "what the traffic will
bear" becomes a question of equal importance with what the
traffic costs. Each element is a limitation upon the other and
the resulting rate is a compromise between the two. Even more
is this apparent in the determination of rate relationships be-
of producing regions, in accordance with whatever social, economic, or
sectional views might at a given time command a majority of votcs in
this commission." Ibid. 390.
57 139 I. C. C. 403, 405.
:8 Commissioners Woodlock and Hall also dissented in the Galveston case,
supra note 23, 128 1. C. C. 399, 402, 160 I. C. C. 362; and Commissioner
Woodlock dissented in the Chemical Lime Case, supra note 46, 136 I. C. C.
at 342.
59 "We recognize that there is a proper sphere of managerial discretion
and enterprise, and so long as corporate action stays within that sphere
we have nothing to do with the carriers and those who voice their policies
and translate them into action. We are not a general manager of the
railroads, or of any of them. We have neither the inclination, the wis-
dom, nor the power to make or regulate rates for the purpose of deter-
mining whether goods shall be bought or sold, produced, manufactured, or
consumed, in one section or locality, or by one set of persons or another.
Such has been the settled policy of the commission from its creation in




tween competing commodities or localities. Here the railroad
manager must make his choice between the distance and equal-
ization principles; decide whether to provide his shippers with
an artificial entry to distant markets, or whether to confine them
to their natural markets, where they have geographical advan-
tages over their competitors. Even should he adopt the latter
policy, the resulting differentials will probably reflect to some
extent equalizing influences, as witness the blanket and group
rates in effect throughout the country. So the decisions of the
railroad manager are formulated in part at least upon consid-
eration of commercial conditions and have no small effect upon
economic destinies.
The Interstate Commerce Commission can hardly be expected
to blindfold itself to the circle of influence thus established be-
tween commercial conditions and the rate system which it must
regulate. In so far as the spheres of management and regula-
tion, overlap, the latter cannot be entirely divorced from com-
mercial considerations. It is rather the extent to which this
overlapping is desirable or necessary that is the real point of
controversy. When the Commission undertakes, for example, to
move rates up or down within the "zone of reasonableness" it
may well be contended that it is usurping the traditional func-
tions of management. But it must also be remembered that
the "zone of reasonableness" is uncertain territory, discovered
not only by cost studies but also by comparison with other rates
which have themselves been influenced by commercial condi-
tions. It is recognition of this essential inter-dependency of
the rate structure that is responsible for the development of
the doctrine of "relative unreasonableness" and similar tenden-
cies toward greater control of rate relationships. This greater
control means less freedom for the railroad manager to arrange
rates in accordance with his own interests in commercial con-
ditions. It means also more opportunity for the Commission to
modify rate geography and to exercise its discretion in deter-
mining the relative limits of the equalization and distance prin-
ciples. Thus in the march of legal formulae here described may
be discerned a significant trend toward greater consideration and
control of commercial conditions in railroad rate regulation.
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SCOPE OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION OVER FALSE AND IISLEADING ADYER-
TISING
THE vast expansion of modern advertising 1 has been accom-
panied by two results which tend somewhat to countervail its
undoubted benefits. It has minimized the personal relationship
in trade, and it has sought to create new demands, generally
for non-essential commodities; and both of these developments
have aggravated the inducements to, and the opportunities for,
deception in the presentation of merchandise.2 In its effort to
abate this growing evil, the Associated Advertising Clubs of the
World sought the assistance of the Federal Trade Commission
one year after its inception in 1914.3 The immediate response
was not enthusiastic, but during the past decade the number of
cases before the Commission involving false advertising has
steadily increased, until, in 1928-1929, they constituted 85c of
the total.4 This remarkable development is clearly indicative of
3 See GOODALL, ADVERTISING: A STUDY OF A MODERN BUSLNSS POvWER
(1914) 73ff; CHERINGTON, ADVERTISING AS A BUSINESS FORCE (1913) 537.
2 PuBLIC REGULATION OF COmIrTrrrIvE PRACTICES (National Industrial
Conference Board, 1925) 19. See also CHASE AND SCHLINK, YOUR MONn 'S
WORTH (1927) c. 1. In the following discussion references to "advertising"
will necessarily include "branding," "labeling," etc. The cases discuss all
indiscriminately and for present purposes there appears to be no valuable
distinction.
3 The Federal Trade Commission Act was passed September 16, 1914. 38
STAT. 717 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 41 (1926). Section 5, with vhich this
comment is solely concerned, declares in part:
"Unfair methods of competition in commerce are declared unlawful.
"The Commission is empowered and directed to prevent persons, partner-
ships or corporations, except banks, and common carriers subject to the
Acts to regulate commerce, from using unfair methods of competition in
commerce.
"Whenever the Commission shall have reason to believe that any such
person, partnership, or corporation has been or is using any unfair method
* . . and if it shall appear to the Commission that a proceeding by it in
respect thereof would be to the interest of the public, it shall issue and serve
upon such person, etc. a complaint stating its charges ... and containing a
notice of a hearing. . . . If upon such hearing the Commission shall be of
the opinion that the method of competition in question is prohibited by this
subdivision . . . it shall make a report in writing in which it Shall state
its findings as to the facts and shall issue . . . an order . . . to cease
and desist.
"If such person fails, etc. or neglects to obey such order.., the Commis-
sion may apply to the circuit court of appeals.... The findings of the Com-
mission as to facts, if supported by testimony shall be conclusive.'
4 Virtually no complaints were issued until 1918. In the fiscal year end-
ing June 30, 1918, only 6% of the proceedings before the Commission con-
cerned misrepresentations; the following years the proportion increased to
14%, 25%, 38%, 40%, 47%, 56% and in 1925 had reached 70c. The same
approximate proportions apply to the cases settled by stipulation, i. e., by
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the relative significance which attaches, in the minds of the
Commissioners, to this form of unfair competition.
While the broad surveillance over deceptive representations
has undoubtedly proved salutary, it* has by no means met with
unanimous approval. Some legal writers have questioned the
Commission's jurisdiction in the field., Others have contended
that to undertake the function of censorship is to detract in
time and expense from the major task, which is generally desig-
nated: the maintenance of open competition., Both of these ob-
jections are voiced in a recent adjudication by the Circuit Court
of Appeals of the Sixth Circuit,7 which, at least by dicta, has
very definitely depreciated the Commission's power in respect
of advertising. An order had been issued against the petitioner
to desist representing its product "Marmola" as a scientific
thyroid cure for obesity and to refrain from advertising it at
all unless the statement were added that it was unsafe unless
taken under a physician's supervision.8 In reversing the order
the court found no issue as to its therapeutic effect, but only
as to its authenticity and safety, and concluded that the terms
"scientific" and "safe" were but matters of opinion. It was
further held that the Commission's jurisdiction does not extend
to a trade practice resulting in no injury to competitors, that
here the only possible competitors were the medical profession
and other manufacturers of patent remedies on the "index pur-
gatorius," and that "the machinery was [not] intended to give
governmental aid to the protection of this kind of trade and com-
merce." 1 It is most improbable that the court intended to indorse
the type of advertisement involved. 10 The true basis of the deci-
agreement before the issuance of a complaint. See ANNUAL RMi'oRT OF
THE FEDERAL TRADE CommissION (1929) 62, 159. Of course by virtue of
the additional powers granted it the Commission performs functions other
than the enforcement by trial and order of the Clayton Act and Section 5
of the Trade Commission Act. See Trade Commission Act, supra note 3,
at §§ 6, 7, 8; FREUND, GROWTH OF AMERICAN ADmINISTRATIVE LAv (1923)
76. Although it is thus impossible to determine precisely to what extent
the Commission's time and expense is consumed by advertising, the increase
in the significance of this method of competition is manifest.
5 Rublee, The Original Plan and Early History of the Federal Trade
Commission (1926) 11 PRoc. AcAD. PoL. Sci. 666, 669; Levy, A Decade
of the Federal Trade Commission (1925) 11 VA. L. REV. 278, 283, 291.
See also dissenting opinion of Denison, J., in Silver Co. v. Federal Trade
Commission, 289 Fed. 985, 992 (C. C. A. 6th, 1923).
6 Watkins, Tue Federal Trade Commission, A Critical Survey (1926) 40
QUARTERLY J. ECON. 561, 582; Soule, What is Unfair Competition (July
1, 1925) 43 NEw REPUDLIC 146, 147; Comment (1919) 88 CENT. L. J. 425.
7 Raladam Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 42 F. (2d) 430 (C. C. A.
6th, 1930).
812 F. T. C. D. 363 (1929).
9 Supra note 7, at 437.
10 See, concerning the proprietary "Marmola," CHASE AND SCHLINK, op.
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sion appears rather to have been another judicial attempt to cur-
tail the Commission's jurisdiction. 1 The case, therefore, prompts
a consideration of the role assumed by the Commission in this
field and the limitations imposed thereupon by the courts.
The statement of the court to the effect that the Commission's
jurisdiction did not extend beyond a "fair relationship" to the
anti-trust acts 2 1would obviously preclude any control over ad-
vertising, and quite possibly reflects the predominant sentiment
in the Senate during the discussion of the Trade Commission
Act. 3 The latter was conceived, in conjunction with the Clayton
Act, during a period of agitation, on the one side for a more
rigid enforcement of the Sherman Law, on the other for greater
leniency in its interpretation. 4  Attempts by the court to solve
the problem by the "rule of reason" had proved unsatisfactory; 1
and the Commission was to be a substitute, more prophylactic
than curative, and to a considerable extent unhampered by
legalistic precedent in its treatment of restraints upon trade.
cit. supra, note 2, at 127; NosTRUis AND QUACKERY (American Medical As-
sociation, 2d ed. 1912) vol. 1, p. 388. Even if the Commission's finding
were equivocal, the court's decision would effect many other cases of patent
remedies and treatments which have recently been investigated and con-
demned. See ANNuAL REPORT Or THE FEDERAL TRE Co 5ussioN (1928)
Complaints No. 1486, 1487, 1507, 1513, 1528; Ibid (1929) Complaints No.
1563, 1564, 1572, 1577, 1591, 1596, 1609, 1615, 1671, 1673, 1677, 1680.
- It is upon this point of jurisdiction that the Supreme Court has granted
a review. U. S. Daily, Nov. 4, 1930, at 2703.
12"The conclusion -was reached [in the Silver case, supra, note 5] that
the Commission came into being as an aid to the enforcement of the gen-
eral governmental anti-trust and anti-monopoly policy, and that its lawful
jurisdiction did not go beyond the limits of fair relationship to that policy.
. . . This court, as now constituted, is prepared to and does adopt the
general view there stated, as to the foundation of the Commission's juris-
diction." Denison, 3., in the Raladam case, supra note 7, at 435, 436.
'3 In the platforms of both major political parties for 1912, and in Presi-
dent Wilson's address to Congress in 1914, the establishment of a trade
commission -was urged as an expedient agency for the enforcement of the
Anti-trust laws, both the Sherman Act [26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C.
§§ 1, 2, 3 (1926)] and the contemplated ClaytoR Act [38 STAT. 730 (1914),
15 U. S. C. § 12 (1927)]. See Daish, The FederaZ Trado Commission
(1914) 24 YALE L. J. 43; Levy, op. cit. dupra note 5, at 21, 190. And prior
to the passage of the Act much of the discussion in the Senate stressed the
function of the prospective Commission in dealing with monopolistic tend-
encies. See 51 CONG. REC. 10376, 11089, 11094, 11380, 11528, 12022 (1914);
Rublee, op. cit. supra note 5, at 668.
-4 See JONES, THE TRUST PROBLEM1 IN THE UNITED STATES (1921) 334
et seq.; HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1924) c. 1; Fried-
man, The Trust Problem In the Light of Sanze Rcecnt Decision (1915) 24
YATE L. J. 488; Hayes, What the Shernzan Anti-T-ruszt Act Has Accomp-
lished (1913) 47 Am. L. Rnv. 697, 709.
'
5
-Levy, The Clayton Law-An Imperfect Supplement To The Shermnan
Law (1916) 3 VA. L. REv. 411, 414, 415. And see 51 CONG. REC. 11086,
11092, 11108, 11236 (1914).
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Furthermore the Supreme Court, in one of its first pronounce-
ments on the powers of the new body, seemed disposed to re-
strict it to monopolistic tendencies and common law unfair com-
petition. 6 .
On the other hand, it seems clear that public concern in the
legislation of 1914 was based on a desire, not merely for active
competition but also for the enforcement of higher standards
of commercial practice within that competition. 17  Consequently,
through the obfuscations of the Senate debates there appears
ample evidence of the deliberate use of broad language to cover
pratices far removed from monopolistic tendencies.", The term
"unfair methods of competition" had never been judicially con-
strued, and at least theoretically was limited only by the "public
interest" clause.19 It cannot be supposed that the sponsors of
the act were unmindful of the tremendous importance of ad-
vertising as a competitive device and a source of unfair prac-
tices. Equally manifest was the desirability of some new agency
to supplement the inadequate protection from misrepresentations
afforded by statute and common law. The civil remedies of a
small consumer, as, for example, in deceit or upon a warranty,
are not only impractical but generally abortive,2 0 while in the
absence of "palming off," trade mark infringement, disparage-
ment, or some other invasion of a property right, it is probable
that a trade competitor could get no relief.21 Moreover the stat-
16 Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421, 40 Sup. Ct, 572
(1920). See, however, the dissent of Mr. Justice Brandeis. Ibid. 435, 436,
40 Sup. Ct. at 577, 578.
17 See PUBLIC REGULATION OF COMPETITIVE PRACTICES, sutp'a note 2, at 40.
See also Watkins, op. cit. supra note 6, at 565, where it is suggested that
one of the sources of agitation for the new legislation was those who be-
lieved that "the old policy appeared to be designed too much for the pro-
tection of competitors, actual and potential, and not enough for the pro-
tection of the customers."
38 See HENDERSON, op cit. supra note 14, at 37, 38; Seligson, Trade Rogue-
lation (1923) 9 A. B. A. J. 698; Montague, Unfair Methods of Compclit~on
(1915) 25 YALE L. J. 20, 29. It is significant that the term "competition in
commerce the purpose of which is to stifle . . . competition," suggested
during the debates, was not adopted, HENDERSON, op. Cit. supra note 14, at
35, and that in discussing "unfair methods" the examples frequently used
were cases of false advertising, 51 CONG. Rsc. 11105 (1914).
10 See Federal Trade Commission v. Beechnut Packing Co., 257 U. S.
441, 453, 42 Sup. Ct. 150, 154 (1921); Hankin, The Jurisdiction of the
Federal Trade Commission (1924) 12 CALIF. L. REV. 179, 180; Gallagher,
The Federal Trade Commission (1915) 10 ILL. L. REV. 31, 32.
2 0 Handler, False and Misleading Advertising (1929) 39 YALE L. J. 22,
23ff. And see CHAPMAN, THE LAw ON ADVERTISING (1929) 24 ot seq;
BISHOP, ADVERTISING AND THE LAW (1928) 68.
21 Handler, op. cit. supra, note 20, at 34ff. For the general nature of
unfair competition under the common law and the extension of its principles
in the United States, see NIMs, UNFAIR COMPETITION (3d ed. 1929) 6ff.,
36; Haines, Efforts To Define Unfair Competition (1919) 29 YALE L. J. 1;
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utes penalizing false and misleading statements concerning goods
have been limited in effect by specific terms 2 or by the reluctance
of both courts and juries to attack business ethics by criminal
methods.3 As a result there remained a vast amount of ad-
vertising virtually secure from civil or criminal attack, and cen-
surable only by private association of manufacturers, publishers
and advertisers.2 4
Note (1929) 29 CoL. L. RM. 45; Note (1925) 38 ILR. L. RE%,. 370. The
case of American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 Fed. 281 (C.
C. A. 6th, 1900), apparently established the rule that misbranding or false
advertising affords no ground for a civil suit by an honest competitor when
the only injury shown is the general injury to the entire trade. Accord:
Ely-Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co., 273 U. S. 132, 47 Sup. Ct. 314
(1927). And see Armstrong Cork Co. v. Ringwalt Linoleum Worhs, 240
Fed. 1022 (C. C. A. 3d, 1917). But cf. Rogers, Predatory Price Cutting
As Unfair Cornpetition (1913) 27 HARv. L. REV. 139, 141, and cases cited
in notes 51, 52, 53 of Prof. Handler's article, supra note 20. The Com-
mission's lack of jurisdiction over intrastate business perhaps prompted
the attempt of L. Hand, J., to extend this common law rule in the Ely-
Norris case. 7 F. (2d) 603 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925).
22Under the National Pure Food and Drugs Act [34 STAT. 768 (1906),
21 U. S. C. § 1 (1926)] and a subsequent amendment [37 STAT. 416 (1912),
21 U. S. C. § 10 (1926)] false statements concerning ingredients, prepara-
tion, and curative qualities became indictable. But both this and similar
statutes concerning particular commodities, such as the Packers and Stock-
yard Act [42 STAT. 159 (1921), 7 U. S. C. § 181 (1926)] apply only to
labels and pamphlets physically connected with the article. The statutory
crime of using the mails to defraud [Federal Criminal Code § 215; 35
STAT. 1130 (1909), 18 U. S. C. § 338 (1926)] and the power of the Post
Office Department to issue fraud orders [17 STAT. 322, 323 (1872), 39 U.
S. C. §§ 259, 732 (1926)] are, of course, restricted to mailed circulars.
The latter remedy, however, has not been exercised to the limit of its
potentiality, and where available is much to be preferred to action by the
Commission, not only because it is more expeditious but because the courts
have been disposed to respect the Postmaster's discretion. See Leach Y.
Carlile, 258 U. S. 138, 42 Sup. Ct. 227 (1922).
23 HENDERSON, op. cit. supra note 14, at 236; Haines, op. cit. supra note
21, at 20. The Printer's Ink Model Statute adopted now by the majority
of states would seem to be comprehensive in its terminology. See Ciw-
MAN, op. cit. supra note 20, at 29; Comment (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 1155;
Legislation (1930) 43 HARV. L. REV. 945; Current Legislation (1917) 17
COL. L. REv. 258. Actually, however, prosecutions under such legislation
have been limited largely to cases of "palming off" and grossly fraudulent
statements of pure fact. Of course the effect of the statute as a moral and
persuasive force in the hands of the Better Business Bureaus is inestimable.
See Handler, op. cit. supra note 20, at 32, 34. "In so far as these laws
[the Model Statutes] apply to 'patent medicine' advertising copy they are
to all intents and purposes a dead letter." Cramp, Truth In Advcrtiaing
Drug Products (1920) 10 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 783, 788.
24 The work of Better Business Bureaus affiliated with the Associated
Advertising Clubs of the World and representing practically every phase
of commerce is far more widespread and probably more valuable than that
of the Commission. See PUBLIC REGULATION OF COMPETITIVE PRACTIcES,
supra note 2, at 234; Handler, op. cit. supra note 20, at 45ff; TRADE PRAC-
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It is not surprising, therefore, that the Commission, under
the broad authorization of the statute, conceived it to be one
of its functions to supplement the existing agencies in the field.
In accordance with the rule established in the Gratz case,23 how-
ever, it remained for the courts to determine whether the term'
"unfair methods" included deceptive advertising resulting in in-
jury, not to an individual competitor but to an entire trade. In
Sears Roebuck Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,20 the first case
to be appealed, the Circuit Court of the Seventh Circuit partially
sustained an order condemning offers of combination sales which
were at the same time deceptive and disparaging; but the deci-
sion was based largely on the latter element. The reluctance
to permit a power of censorship, however, was clearly revealed
by another Circuit Court two years later in the case of Winsted
Hosiery Co. v. Federal Trade Commission.27 Here the respond-
ent had been ordered to desist from selling as "wool," "merino,"
or "worsted" goods of which the principal, and frequently the
only, constituent was cotton. The practice had become wide-
spread throughout the trade. While admitting the possible de-
TICE CONFERENCE, PUBLISHERS OF PERIODICALS (1928). A perusal of AC-
CURACY AND FAIR PLAY IN THE REPRESENTATION OF MERCHANDISE, pub-
lished monthly in New York City since 1925, and of the New York Bureau's
quarterly report reveals the scope of their influence.
Many trade associations have also adopted stringent, if unenforceable,
codes of honesty in advertising. See JONES, TRADE ASSOCIATION ACTIVITIES
AND THE LAW (1922) 34 et seq. In addition may be mentioned the pub-
lisher's codes, the National Association of Credit Men, and in the field of
patent medicine, the American Medical Association. See Raladam case,
supra note 7, at 436, 437.
25 Supra note 16. See also Federal Trade Commission v. Curtis Publish-
ing Co., 260 U. S. 568, 43 Sup. Ct. 210 (1923); Federal Trade Commission
v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U. S. 463, 43 Sup. Ct. 450 (1923).
26258 Fed. 307 (C. C. A. 7th, 1919). See Note (1919) 8 CALIF. L. RmV.
48; (1919) 29 YALE L. J. 125. The petitioner had adopted the policy of
combination orders as a war time profiteering practice. Obviously wavering
between a conviction that the practice was unfair and a reluctance to
exceed common law precedents, the court involved itself in the following
obvious paradox: "On the face of this statute the legislative intent is
apparent. The Commissioners are not required to aver and prove that
any competitor has been damaged or that any purchaser has been deceived.
The Commissioners representing the government as parens patriae are to
exercise their common sense as informed by their knowledge of the general
idea of unfair trade at common law and stop all those trade practices that
have a capacity or a tendency to injure competitors directly or through
deception of purchasers, quite irrespective of whether the specific practices
in question have yet been denounced in common law cases. But the re-
straining order of the Commission is merely provisional. The trader is
entitled to his day in court, and there the same principles and tests that have
been applied under the common law or under statutes . . . are expected
by Congress to control." 258 Fed. at 311. See Comment (1919) 88 CENT.
L. J. 425.
27 272 Fed. 957 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921).
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ception of consumers, the court nevertheless held that the Com-
mission "was not a censor of commercial morals generally" and
that the practice was "in no way connected with unfair competi-
tion, but is like any other misdescription or misbranding of
products." 2 The Supreme Court, however, reinstated the order
on the ground that although retailers were perhaps no longer
deceived, yet the tendency of the practice would be to injure the
public and to divert trade from honest manufacturers; accord-
ingly it was ruled to be within the purview of the statute.-
Henceforth the Commission's broad jurisdiction over such adver-
tising has been repeatedly upheld in cases involving false state-
ments as to quality or ingredients, geographical source and the
like.20
On the other hand, the courts, displaying a natural apprehen-
sion toward a body invested with such wide and indefinite author-
ity,31 have tempered the power thus acknowledged by a steady
vigilance, which in effect has allayed all fears of an arbitrary
discretion in the Commission. In apparent contradiction to the
wording of the Act, the "public interest" prerequisite has been
reviewed as a justiciable fact.32 Moreover, although the statute
23 Ibid. 960, 961.
29258 U. S. 483, 42 Sup. Ct. 384 (1922); (1921-22) 20 Blica. L. REv. 122,
919.
30 Quality and Ingredients: Federal Trade Commission v. Kay, 35 F.
(2d) 160 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929); Mlasland Duraleather Co. v. Federal Trade
Commission, 34 F. (2d) 733 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929); Indiana Quartered Oak
Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 26 F. (2d) 340 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928),
certioerari denied, 258 U. S. 623 (1928); Sea Island Thread Co. v. Federal
Trade Commission, 22 F. (2d) 1019 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927) ; Proctor & Gamble
Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 11 F. (2d) 47 (C. C. A. 6th, 192G),
certioa ari denied, 273 U. S. 717, 718 (1926); Guarantee Veterinary Co. v.
Federal Trade Commission, 285 Fed. 853 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922); Royal Baking
Powder Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 281 Fed. 744 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922).
Geographical Source: Bradley v. Federal Trade Commission, 31 F. (2d)
569 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929). Trade Status: Pure Silk Hosiery Mills v. Federal
Trade Commission, 3 F. (2d) 105 (C. C. A. 7th, 1924). Second-Hand Goods
Sold For Firsts: Fox Film Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, 29G Fed.
353 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924); (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 885.
31
"They [the words 'unfair methods of competition'] suggest an ethical
criterion rather than one dependent on expert knowledge or experience,
and the spirit of American institutions has not been friendly to the creation
of a class of administrative or political specialists upon questions of ethics."
HENDERSON, op. cit. supra note 14, at 99. And, of course, the theoretically
anomalous situation of a single body officiating as both prosecutor and
judge must have a very definite psychological effect as regards the con-
fidence in which such a body is held.
32 Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner, 280 U. S. 19, 50 Sup. Ct. 1
(1929), noted in (1930) 28 MicH. L. REv. 923; "(1930) 30 COL. L. 11Ev. 270;
Ostermoor v. Federal Trade Commission, 16 F. (2d) 962 (C. C. A. 2d,
1927), noted in Comment (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 1155; Bene & Sons v.
Federal Trade Commission, 299 Fed. 468 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924); Silver Co.
v. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 5. The wording of the Trade
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interest.39 With respect to the subject of this comment, how-
ever, the various limitations hitherto imposed seem primarily
based on the "public interest" clause' Given its obvious construc-
tion, this provision implies that a governmental agency is not
expected to initiate proceedings in a petty competitive contro-
versy.40 As a corollary it has been questioned whether, in
the absence of countervailing circumstances, the Commission
should ever act where a statute covers the unfair practice or
where there is adequate civil or equitable remedy; in this view
many orders appear unwise.41 It has been said that a substantial
part of the public must be misled.42 In no case, however, does
the reversal of an order appear to have been grounded solely
on the paucity of the consumers of the commodity or service
advertised. The restriction would seem rather to refer to the
degree of decepti6n and to deny the Commission's right to ban
39 See, for example, the Sinclair case, supra note 25, where the court,
finding the practice involved not. to be opposed to the public interest, con-
cluded that it was not unfair. . In view of the probable inclusion of the
broad concept of public interest in any determination of unfairness, this
confusion is not unnatural. Properly construed, however, the "public in-
terest" clause of the statute presents a narrower issue: granting the un-
fairness of the practice, is the public concern therein sufficient to warrant
a proceeding. See (1930) 30 COL. L. REV. 270. The negative effect of the
clause is to secure the Commission from attack for failure to issue a com-
plaint upon application.
40 Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner, supra note 32; Silver Co. v.
Federal Trade Commission, supra note 5. A prognostication of this limi-
tation, even before the "public interest" clause was inserted, was voiced
during the Senate debate. 51 CoNG. REC. 11109 (1914).
41 In Lighthouse Rug Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 35 F. (2d) 163
(C. C. A. 7th, 1929); Federal Trade Commission v. Balme, 23 F. (2d) 615
(C. C. A. 2d, 1928); Juvenile Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Co., 289 Fed. 57
(C. C. A. 9th, 1923), orders issued where other remedy existed wore upheld
on appeal, the court ignoring the question of public interest in proceedings
under such circumstances. The legal or equitable remedy, besides being
available, would seem far more efficacious: it provides for damages to the
injured competitor and for an immediate cessation of the practice. If
there be countervailing circumstances, such as the comparative weakness
of the complainant or the prevalence of the practice throughout a trade,
they should be inserted in the report. HENDERSON, Op. Cit. sUpra note 14,
at 168, 228; Cf. PUBLIC REGULATION OF COMPETITIVE PRACTICES, aupra note
2, at 149. The Commission's practice in this respect has been to some ex-
tent ameliorated by a conference ruling to the effect that it will not "en-
tertain proceedings . . . where the alleged violation of law is a purely
private controversy, redressable in the courts, except where such practices
substantially tend to suppress competition as affecting the public." AN-
NUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1925) 111. See also
Rulings 46, 58, 74 in 1 F. T. C. D. 548, 554, 560..
2 See Ostermoor v. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 32, at 964;
Silver Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 5, at 1001; Chicago
Portrait Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 4 F. (2d) 759, 763 (C. C. A.
7th, 1924).
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"puffing" where the "average" consumer is not mislead.43 Fin-
ally a recent case holds apparently that where the product offered
for sale is actually superior to that denoted by the label or ad-
vertisement, the latter is not opposed to the public interest.4
On the other hand, the ruling that prior cessation of the con-
demned practice is no bar to a desist order = seems unfortun-
ate, for at least where there is no reasonable prospect of repeti-
tion, a proceeding is totally devoid of public interest. To some
extent this has been ameliorated by conference rulings of the
Commission itself.0  It becomes apparent that the essence of
the public interest requirement has never been clearly and com-
prehensively demonstrated by the courts. But as a general con-
clusion, it may be stated that in the absence of other ground for
reversal, the Commission's preliminary discretion in the selec-
tion of cases will be sustained.4 7
In the Ra14arm case, the court, by requiring proof of the ex-
43 This was undoubtedly the basis of the decision in the Ostermoor case,
supra note 32, and, while its application to that case may be doubted, seems
a justifiable limitation in general. Cf. Handler, op. cit. supra note 20, at
30, 44. For examples of proceedings against advertisements that could
be called deceptive only by stretching the imagination, see Federal Trade
Commission v. Geneva Watch Co., 6 F. T. C. D. 452 (1923); Federal Trade
Commission v. Universal Battery Service Co., 2 F. T. C. D. 99 (1919).
44Berkey & Gay Furniture Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, supra note
33. The situation in this case was foreshadowed in the Senate discussion.
See 51 CoNG. REC. 11106 (1914).
45 Scars Roebuck & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 26
(Alschuler, J., dissenting on this point); Fox Film Corp. v. Federal Trade
Commission, supra note 30 (where the ruling was probably justified on
ground that acts complained of were necessarily isolated and sporadic);
Guarantee Veterinary Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 30.
But cf. Silver Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 5, at 992.
' Conference Rulings 57 and 65, 1 F. T. C. D. 554, 556, declaring in
effect that where the use of a simulating name has been discontinued and
assurance received that it would not be resumed, it is not in the public
interest to issue a complaint.
47,See Moir v. Federal Trade Commission, 12 F. (2d) 22, 28 (C. C. A.
1st, 1926). Quite obviously if a wrong has been remedied by the Commis-
sion's intervention, courts would be reluctant to reestablish the unfair
practice simply because it was of small consequence. Nor would such
a case ordinarily be appealed if the moral turpitude is clear or if the cor-
rection of the practice would effect no appreciable loss. In fact, these
cases of small consequence are largely disposed of by a mere notice to
the transgressor. Peycke, The Federal Trade Commission (1922) 7 M5INN.
L. REv. 11. Commissioner W. E. Humphrey estimates that 85t of the
cases before the Commission undergo this summary disposition. Humphrey,
op. cit. supra, note 37.
Where a business is inherently small, as in the case of a retail store
with only community patronage, it is probably advisable that the Commis-
sion not act. But where the business, though small, is potentially large
and perhaps may increase by the use of an unfair method, as in the case




istence of honest competitors, has devised a further restriction
upon the Commission's control of advertising. In the course of
the decision, Denison, J., said:
"The general law of unfair competition uses the misleading
of the ultimate retail purchaser as evidence of the primarily vital
fact, injury to the lawful dealer; the Commission uses this
ultimate presumed 'injury to the final user as itsetf the vital fact.
The result is ... a pro tanto censorship by the Commission of
all advertising." 48
Parenthetically it should be noted that the court has not con-
troverted by affirmative evidence the formal findings of the Com-
mission that there were legitimate competitors. 4  On the other
hand, by sanctioning the advertisement in question it would seem
to have barred itself from assuming the non-existence of equally
lawful competitors.
But even granting that the bulk of the competitors were un-
worthy of protection ° (quaere of the physicians), to base a
decision on that fact, while admitting the ill-effects of the prac-
tice on the public, is to adhere rigidly to the common law con-
cept of unfair competition as an invasion of competitors' prop-
erty rights.51 It is very definitely to imply that the primary
emphasis of the Commission's function is still the protection to
competitors rather than the maintenance of a plane of com-
mercial practice for the benefit of consumers. That a different
emphasis was contemplated is revealed by parts of the Senate
debates on the Commission Bill,s2 by the insertion of the "public
interest" clause, and by the absence of any provision enabling
private competitors to prosecute a complaint. The same con-
clusion is compelled by the frequent judicial pronouncements
stressing the fraud against the public as the evil primarily to be
cured.5 In accord with these views the Commission, in its legal
48 IRaladam Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 7, at 436.
49 Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 12 F. T. C. D. 363, 368
(1929).
so See CHASE AND SCHLINK, op. cit supra note 2, at 49; Cramp, op. oit.
supra note 23, at 789.
51 See note 21 supra. But cf. Nmis, op. cit. supra note 21, at 27. "The
doctrine of unfair competition is probably lodged upon the theory of the
protection of the public whose rights are infringed or jeopardized by
the confusion of goods produced by unfair methods of trade, as well as
upon the rights of a complainant to enjoy the good will of a trade built
up by his efforts and sought to be taken from him by unfair methods."
Cole Co. v. American Cement & Oil Co., 130 Fed. 703, 705 (C. C. A. 7th,
1904).
52 See 51, CONG. REC. 11102, 11103, 11105, 11108, 11178, 11533. See also
HENDERSON, op. cit. supra note 14, at 35; Gallagher, op. cit. supra note 19,
at 35, 42; supra note 17.
5' See in particular Federal Trade Commission v. Kay, supra note 30,
[Vol. 40
COMMENTS
activities, has very clearly leaned toward the protection of cus-
tomers. It is true that in the great majority of cases, injury to
honest competitors is reasonably presumed. Nevertheless com-
plaints have repeatedly been issued where the deceptive prac-
tice permeated the trade and where consequently no injury to
direct competitors was demonstrable.t In the Wisted case1
jurisdiction in such cases was upheld. And more recently the
Commission has instituted proceedings where the competitors in
the trade were of negligible significance; 50 indeed in some cases
all reference to them is omitted from the findings of fact.7
Moreover a logical application of the court's hypothesis would
lead to anomalous results. It imports, for example, that although
by the statute proceedings are to be instituted in the public inter-
est, yet where the public alone is injured by a fraudulent practice,
the Commission is not authorized to intervene. Again, if the
deception is prevalent tlroughout an entire trade, it becomes
impregnable; but when one honest competitor enters the field, the
Commission's jurisdiction is established. Finally, compliance
with the court's rule would compel the Commission in every case
to try the legitimacy of the activities of competitors.c s It cannot
be supposed that such incongruities were intended. Rather
would it seem that the "unfair methods" referred to in the Trade
Commission Act include any policy of sales promotion which
tends to deceive the public 9
The true source of the court's decision, it is thought, is a
lingering conviction that the Commission is evading the pmpose
of its creation, and a reluctance to extend its power of censorship
to the limitless field of patent remedy advertisements. Admit-
tedly the Commission has been underta ing an excessive vol-
at 162; Federal Trade Commission v. Kiesner, supra note 32, at 27, 50
Sup. Ct. at 3, 4; Royal Baking Powder Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,
supra note 30, at 753. In the Kay case the respondent was ordered to
desist advertising as radium a product found to possess no radioactive
property. The court found no difficulty in "protecting" the sources of true
radium, which are probably medical centers and physicians. In the Raladam
case, however, the court did not believe physicians to be genuine competi-
tors in commerce. No basic difference is discernible between the two cases.
4 SeePUBLIC REGULATIONS OF Co'PmrITEn PRACTIcEs, supra note 2, at
114. Trades in which misleading terms in advertising were prevalent and
against which the Commission has acted include manfacturers of textiles,
soap, varnish, and furniture.
rs Supra note 29.
56 See supra note 10.
57 See for example Federal Trade Commission v. Marsay School of Beauty
Culture, 12 F. T. C. D. 303 (1929).
5 Upon this point the Department of Justice seems to have based its
petition for a review. U. S. Daily, Nov. 4, 1930, at 2705.
- In line with this argument are the views of former Commissioner
Gaskill of the Trade Commission. See Gaskil, op. cit. supra note 35, at
677ff. See also WASSER AN, op. cit. supra note 37, at 126.
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ume of work.60 Some limitation is necessary. But it is difficult,
in view of the varied suggestions of legal writers, to determine
precisely in what direction this limitation should be effected."1
In any event it may be questioned whether this is not an admin.
strative problem peculiarly within the discretion of the Commis-
sion itself. Restrictive rulings already adopted 02 and the estab-
lishment of a separate committee for false advertising 63 should
considerably expedite proceedings in this field. Beyond that, if
the Commission has stressed advertising to the neglect of com-
binations and other practices allegedly in restraint of trade, it
accords with the current trend of economic thought, which modi-
fies the "open competition" fetish and substitutes tolerance for
suspicion of business methods.4
The patent remedy lure is an admitted evil. That a new gov-
ernmental scourge is not superfluous is clear. There seems no
reason why an administrative body, whose charter is broad and
whose advantages are manifold, should not be exploited to the
limits of its usefulness.
60 See TOULMIN, op. cit. supra note 37, at c. 6; PUBLIC REGULATION O
COMPETITIVE PRACTICES, supra note 2, at 219; Soule, op. cit. supra note 6,
at 147. There was no lack of trepidation during the Senate discussion as
to the wide scope and volume of the Commission's work and the resultant
expense. See 51 CONG. REC. 11181, 11300 (1914). It is noteworthy that
from 1925 to 1929 there was a consistent decline in the number of com-
plaints pending at the beginning of each fiscal year. During the fiscal
year 1928-1929, however, there occurred a sharp rise in the number of
complaints docketed, with the result that the complaints pending at the
end of that fiscal year exceeded the totals of the previous three years. See
ANNUAL REPORT (1929) 115.
61 In at least one view, the Commission, by its extra-legal investigations,
has usurped the functions of already existing governmental departments.
TOULMIN, op. cit. supra note 37, at c. 3. The same writer has criticized
the trade practice conferences. Ibid. 28. See also BUSINESS VEEK (April
30, 1930) 5. It is frequently suggested that the Commission should refrain
from independent prosecutions of Sherman Act violators, and at most per-
form the function of a Master in Chancery for the Attorney General in
such cases. Watkins, op. cit. supra note 6, at 583; Lynde, The Federal
Trade Commission and Its Relation To The Courts (1916) 63 ANN. AM.
AcAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 24, 35. And of course it is very generally, and
most justifiably, urged that greater discretion in the selection of advertising
cases be employed. PUBLIC REGULATION OF COMPETITIVE PRACTICES, supra
note 2, at 98, 115, 119ff.
62 See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1929) 159;
supra notes 41 and 46.
63 This special subdivision of three attorneys was created by order of
the Commission in 1929. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COM-
MISSION (1929) 55.
r, See EDDY, THE NEw COMPETITION (7th ed. 1920) c. 4, 8; Watkins,
op. cit. supra note 6, at 569.
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ACTUAL AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION IN ADVERSE
POSSESSION i
As the population of the United States has grown, it has become
of progressively increasing importance to develop the natural
resources and other advantages of wild lands. Such lands have,
consequently, been the subject of frequent litigation, in the course
of which reliance has often been placed on the doctrine of adverse
possession for the purpose of asserting title., The resulting
development of this branch of property law has not been unat-
tended by confusion in respect to the requirement that the pos-
sessory acts be actual and notorious. Some of the difficulties en-
countered are thrown into particularly bold relief when the
landowner has no actual knowledge of the acts upon which the
adverse claim is premised.
The legal aspects of the problem, in its bearing upon wild
lands, were recently illustrated by the case of Murray v. Bons-
quet,2 which was an action to quiet title and enjoin trespass on
a piece of property claimed by inclosure and the pasturing of
cattle. The land was part of a valley lying in a wild and moun-
tainous region, used only for pasturage and visited only by hun-
ters and herdsmen. In deciding for the defendant holder of the
record title, who lived in Chicago and had no knowledge of the
use that had been made of his property, the Supreme Court of
Washington gave particular weight to the lack of notoriety of
the plaintiff's possession, which it held insufficient to support a
presumption of notice to the owner. In the view of the court,
to decide otherwise "would be to announce a rule under which
a man might be disseised without his knowledge, and the statute
of limitations would run against him when he had no reason
to believe that his seisin had been interrupted."
The case appeared against a background of Washington deci-
sions that left it an open question which of two somewhat op-
posing standards would be employed in determining the degree
of notoriety necessary to adverse possession. On the one hand,
it had been decided that the possessory acts may vary with the
nature of the ground, and that where every use has been made
of the property of which it is susceptible, more will not be re-
quired,3 it being sufficient if the claim be evidenced by such acts
1 Miller v. Chicago Mill & Lumber Co., 140 Ark. 639, 215 S. W. 900
(1919); Carrere v. City of New Orleans, 162 La. 981, 111 So. 393 (1926);
Central Maine Power Co. v. Rollins, 126 Me. 299, 138 AtI. 170 (1927);
Doctor v. Turner, 231 N. W. 115 (Mich. 1930); Dead River Fishing &
Hunting Club v. Stovall, 147 Miss. 385, 113 So. 336 (1927); Andrus v.
Hutchinson, 17 F. (2d) 472 (C. C. A. 5th, 1927).
2154 Wash. 42, 280 Pac. 955 (1929).
3 Grays Harbor Commercial Co. v. McCulloch, 113 Wash. 203, 193 Pac.
709 (1920); Alexander v. Bennett, 91 Wash. 688, 158 Pac. 534 (1916).
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as the owner would perform ;4 and on the other, that the face
and appearance of the ground mustuhave been completely
changed, so as to inform a casual observer that possession had
been taken.5
Inasmuch as the first mentioned tests would seem to demand
a result opposite to that reached in the principal case, it becomes
pertinent to inquire first, whether in point of fact the applica-
tion of these tests generally leads to such opposite result; second,
if not, whether the lack of actual notice, emphasized in the opin-
ion, accounts for the unwillingness of the court to apply the tests;
third, if this be found improbable, what other factors may have
controlled the decision.
The two divergent views implicit in the language of the earlier
Washington decisions are expressions of two different methods
of approach that prevail in the United States. The traditional
statement of one is taken from the declaration of the United
States Supreme Court in Ewing v. Burnet that acts of owner-
ship are evidence of adverse possession "if the jury shall think
that the property was not susceptible of a more strict or definite
possession," and that "neither actual occupation, cultivation, or
residence, are necessary to constitute actual possession when
the property is so situated as not to admit of any permanent use-
ful improvement, and the continued claim of the party has been
evidenced by public acts of ownership, such as he would exercise
over property which he claimed in his own right, and would not
exercise over property which he did not claim." o
The other view is well expressed by the Virginia court ' in
Taylor's Divisees v. Burnsides, where Ewing v. Burnet is ex-
pressly limited to its facts, and the conclusion id reached that
"wild and uncultivated lands cannot be made the subjects of
adversary possession while they remain completely in a state
of nature." It follows that if the claimant has not accomplished
some change of condition, "it is in vain for him to say, that he
has had all the possession of which the property was then sus-
Thus, town lots, being laid out for the purpose of erecting dwellings, are
not susceptible of adverse possession by clearing, grading, fencing and
gardening, Peoples Savings Bank v. Bufford, 90 Wash. 204, 155 Pac. 1068
(1916); a fortio7i where no fencing, Smith v. Chambers, 112 Wash. 600,
192 Pac. 891 (1920), whereas similar acts on other than town lots have
been considered sufficient, Jackman v. Germain, 96 Wash. 415, 165 Pac.
78 (1917); Lawrence v. Mitchell, 140 Wash. 355, 248 Pac. 882 (1926).
-Bellingham Bay Land Co. v. Dibble, 4 Wash. 764, 31 Pac. 30 (1892).
5 Flint v. Long, 12 Wash. 342, 41 Pac. 49 (1895).
611 Pet. 41, 53 (U. S. 1837).
7 Although in Dawson v. Watkins, 41 Va. 259 (1843), this jurisdiction




ceptible; for that would lead to constructive possession, which
is only attributable to the rightful owner." $
It may be supposed that these doctrines are not necessarily
opposed to each other; and it is granted that in most cases in-
volving land in settled districts, the same results are reached
under both. But it will be found that they generally lead to
opposite results in cases concerned with wild landsf This con-
clusion holds true as applied to the facts of the principal case,
for under the Ewing v. Bume t tests the pasturing and fencing
of land unsuited for other purposes has been held a sufficient
possession,10 whereas in cases where these tests have not been
applied, it has been held to the contrary." It seems, therefore,
s 42 Va. 165, 198 (1844). This doctrine has been consistently followed.
Overton's Heirs v. Davisson, 42 Va. 211 (1844); Koiner v. Rankin's Heirs,
52 Va. 420 (1854); Turpin v. Saunders, 73 Va. 27 (1879); Harman v.
Ratcliff, 93 Va. 249, 24 S. E. 1023 (1896); Austin v. Minor, 107 Va. 101,
57 S. E. 609 (1907); City of Richmond v. Jones, 111 Va. 214, 63 S. E.
181 (1910); Whealton & Wisherd v. Doughty, 112 Va. 649, 72 S. E. 112
(1911); Craig-Giles Iron Co. v. Wickline, 126 Va. 223, 101 S. E. 22;
(1919).
9 Compare the following cases: (a) T-hinbcring-Clement v. Perry, 34
Iowa 564 (1872), with Parker v. Parker, 1 Allen 245 (Mass. 1861),
Bailey v. Irby, 2 Nott & McC. 343 (S. C. 1820), Smith v. Morrow, 30
Ky. 442 (1832), Wilson v. Stivers, 34 Ky. 634 (1836). (b) Hunting or
fishing-Illinois Steel Co. v. Bilot, 109 Wis. 418, 85 N. W. 402 (1901),
with Leavenworth v. Reeves, 106 Miss. 722, 64 So. 660 (1914), Dead River
Fishing & Hunting Co. v. Stovall, supra note 1, Austin v. Minor, smpra
note 8. (c) Hunting or fishing and grazing, fencing, or tirnbcring-Gore
v. Todd, 150 Md. 285, 133 AtI. 126 (1926), Gunby v. uinn, 156 Md. 123,
142 Atl. 910 (1928), Baum v. Currituck Shooting Club, 96 N. C. 310, 2
S. E. 673 (1887), Gray's Harbor Commercial Co. v. McCulloch, aupra
note 3, with Philbin v. Carr, 75 Ind. App. 560, 129 N. E. 19, (1920), 162
N. E. 247 (1928). (d) Grazing and haying or timbering-Dice v. Brown,
98 Iowa 297, 67 N. W. 253 (1896), with Whealton & Wisherd v. Doughty,
supra, note 8, McCook v. Crawford, 114 Ga. 337, 40 S. E. 225 (1901).
(e) Grazing, inclosure, and building-Seavey v. Williams, 97 Ore. 310,
191 Pac. 779 (1920), with Chilton v. White, 72 W. Va. 545, '78 S. E. 1048
(1913). (f) Paying taxeg and grazing or timbcring and other iniscel-
laneous, isolated acts-Menkens v. Ovenhouse, 22 Mo. 70 (1855), Me-
Caughn v. Young, 85 Miss. 277, 37 So. 839 (1904), Bellingham Bay Land
Co. v. Dibble, supra note 4, with Taylor's Divisees v. Burnsides, supra note
8, Brown v. Rose, 48 Iowa 231 (1878), 55 Iowa 734, 7 N. W. 133 (1881).
20 Bloodsworth v. Murray, 138 Md. 631, 114 Atl. 575 (1921). See also
Lantry v. Parker, 37 Neb. 353, 55 N. W. 962 (1893); Moore v. Curtis,
169 N. C. 74, 85 S. E. 132 (1915).
n Pray v. Pierce, 7 Tyng 381 (Mass. 1811) ; Trotter v. Newton, 71 Va.
582 (1877). When courts have held, without the aid of the Ewing v.
Burnet tests, that adverse possession was established by grazing and in-
closure, it will usually be found that they have been controlled by statute-
of the New York type, which make express provision for adverse pos-
session by substantial inclosure. The California statute, which is of this
type, further provides that when the adverse claim is founded upon a writ-
ten instrument or upon a court decree or judgment, pasturage shall he
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that the decision in the principal case cannot be explained as a
consequence upon the normal application of the Eving v. Burnet
rules.
It may now be asked to what extent the court was influenced
to reject these rules in the principal case by the fact of the
owner's non-residence ' resulting in. his actual ignorance of the
adverse claim.
sufficient, though the land be uninclosed. CAL. CODES OF CIV. PROC. (Deer-
ing, 1923) § 325. Where the claim is not founded on a written instru-
ment, however, and the statute consequently does not apply, it is hold to
the contrary. Kern County Land Co. v. Nighbert, 75 Cal. App. 103, 241
Pac. 915 (1925).
There are a number of Texas cases in which grazing and inclosure
have been held sufficient without reference to the Ewing v. Burnet tests.
Cantagrel v. Von Lupin, 58 Tex. 570 (1883); Harris v. Bryson, 34 Tex.
Civ. App. 532, 80 S. W. 105 (1904); Loring v. Jackson, 43 Tex. Civ. App.
306, 95 S. W. 19 (1906); Hardy Oil Co. v. Burnham, 58 Tex, Civ. App.
285, 124 S. W. 221 (1909), 147 S. W. 330 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912); Appel
v. Childress, 53 Tex. Civ. App. 607, 116 S. W. 129 (1909); Hermann v.
Fenn, 61 Tex. Civ. App. 283, 129 S. W. 1139 (1910); Unknown Heirs v.
Robbins, 152 S. W. 210 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912); Griswold v. Comer, 161
S. W. 423 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913); Randolph v. Lewis, 163 S. W. 647 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1913), aff'd, 210 S. W. 795 (Tex. Comm. App. 1919). Texas
has not adopted the New York statute. But the statutes under which the
above cases were decided require either a written and duly registered
memorandum of title, or a registered deed. TEX. REV. CIv, STAT. (1925)
arts. 5509-5510. The fact that an adverse claim is founded on a regis-
tered muniment of title contributes to the element of notoriety, Griswold
v. Comer, supra, and this may have influenced the Texas courts to sanction
a possession of the character in question.
A few statements will be found in other jurisdictions to the effect that
less notorious and less frequent acts will be required to constitute actual
possession when they are performed under color of title. Draper v. Shoot,
25 Mo. 197 (1857); Turner v. Hall, 60 Mo. 271 (1875); Woods v. Monte-
vallo Coal & Transportation Co., 84 Ala. 560, 3 So. 475 (1887) ; Baker v.
DeArmijo, 17 N. M. 383, 128 Pac. 73 (1912); State v. Morgan, 75 W. Va.
92, 83 S. E. 288 (1914); Franklin v. Snow, 195 Ala. 569, 71 So. 93 (1916);
SEDGwicK & WAIT, TRIAL OF TITLE To LAND (2d ed. 1886) 641; WOOD,
LIMITATIONS OF AcTIONS (4th ed. 1916) 1250, and cases cited. But this
does not appear to be the general view. Coburn v. Hollis, 3 Metc. 125
(Mass. 1841); Ege v. Medlar, 82 Pa. 86 (1876); Keefe v. Brainhall,
14 D. C. 551 (1885) ; Merwin v. Morris, 71 Conn. 555, 42 Atl. 855 (1899);
Sharp v. Shenandoah Furnace Co., 100 Va. 27, 40 S. E. 103 (1901).
A dictum in Moran v. Moseley, 164 S. V. 1093 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914),
suggests that, even in the absence of recorded title, Texas courts would
hold that adverse possession might be established by grazing and inclosure,
provided this be the use to which the land should be best adapted. It is
consequently uncertain whether these courts have held such acts sufficient,
in the cases cited, because the factor of recorded title was present, or
because they have been inclined to favor the Ewing v. Burnet tests.
12 Residence of the owner in the vicinity apparently goes to prove actual
knowledge or to aid the presumption of knowledge. Melvin v. Proprietors
of Locks and Canals, 16 Pick. 137 (Mass. 1834); Leeper v. Baker, 68
Mo. 400 (1878); Whitaker v. Erie Shooting Club, 102 Mich. 454, 60 N. W.
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The language in which the court expressed reliance on this
fact first occurs in Proprietors of the Kennebeck Purchase v.
Springer, where, in deciding that marking boundaries and cut-
ting grass did not constitute sufficient possession, it was said:
"To constitute a disseisin of the owner of uncultivated lands
by the entry and occupation of a party not claiming title to the
land, the occupation must be of that nature and notoriety, that
the owner may be presumed to know that there is a possession
of the land adverse to his title; otherwise a man may be disseised
without his knowledge, and the statute of limitations may run
against him while he has no ground to believe that his seisin
has been interrupted." 13
Somewhat similar expressions will be found in Pray v. Pierce;14
but when the same court was subsequently urged to place an
interpretation upon them which would require actual notice to
the owner, it stated:
"It was said that there cannot be a disseisin without notice,
and that as the mortgagor and mortgagee were out of the Com-
monwealth, they would not be disseised; but acts of notoriety,
such as building a fence around the land or erecting buildings
upon it, are notice to all the world." 13
It is thus evident both from the context in which this language
originally appeared, and from the early interpretation it re-
ceived, that actual notice was not contemplated. On the con-
trary, it has become a generally accepted principle that a pre-
sumption of notice is sufficient,'0 and that the presumption will
be supported by possession of such character as to apprise the
public in general,' the community in the vicinity of the land
in question, 8 a stranger coming upon it,19 or the owner should
983 (1894); Ambrose v. Huntington, 34 Ore. 484, 56 Pac. 513 (1899);
O'Banion v. Simpson, 44 Nev. 188, 191 Pac. 1083 (1920). But non-resi-
dence does not defeat the presumption of knowledge. Worthley v. Bur-
banks, 146 Ind. 534, 45 N. E. 779 (1896); Baber v. Baber, 121 Va. 740,
94 S. E. 209 (1917); Wilson v. Storthz, 117 Ark. 418, 175 S. W. 45 (1915);
Miller v. Chicago Mill & Lumber Co., supra note 1; Harrison v. Speer, 94
Fla. 937, 114 So. 515 (1927). However, for a statement emphasizing this
factor very much as in the main case, see Bethum v. Turner, 1 Me. 111
(1820).
13 4 Tyng 416, 419 (lass. 1808).
l 4 Supra note 11, at 383.
is Poignard v. Smith, 6 Pick. 172, 177 (lass. 1828).
3, TIFFANY REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) § 501; (1911) 11 CoL. L. REV.
673.
-1 Truesdale v. Ford, 37 Ill. 210 (1865); Frazer v. Seureau, 60 Tex.
Civ. App. 416, 128 S. W. 649 (1910).
1L8 Morrison v. Kelly, 22 Ill. 610 (1859); Russell v. Mandell, 73 fI1. 136
(1874); Worthley v. Burbanks, supra note 12; Harrison v. Speer, supra.
note 12.
'
0 Eureka Mining & Smelting Co. v. Way, 11 Nev. 171 (1876).
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he visit the premises.20
. In view of the foregoing, it is clear that a man may be dis-
seised without his knowledge. But inasmuch as statements to
the contrary are not infrequently encountered, it seems that they
must almost of necessity carry a meaning more nearly in accord-
ance with established principles than is suggested by a literal
interpretation.
Adverse possession demands a possession which shall be actual
and notorious. Since actual refers to the physical character of
the possession, and notorious to the attention it attracts, the rule
on its face requires two distinct elements. Moreover, they are in
fact distinct. A mere claim, a possession entirely constructive, a
trespass, will not set the statute in motion, though known to the
owner, 21 for what is required to be notorious is an actual pos-
session. But due to the close connection between these elements
in respect to the physical basis on which they rest, their presence
in a given case is usually determined by the same criterion-
namely, the sufficiency of the possession to raise a presumption
of notice.22 The result is that it often appears uncertain from
the application of the test by' the courts whether the physical
character of the acts alleged to constitute possession is under con-
sideration, or their notoriety.
It will be noticed, furthermore, that statements that one may
not be disseised without his knowledge are usually employed in
deciding against a party who predicates his possession on acts
of a very equivocal nature. 23
These circumstances afford ground for the supposition that
the real objection in such cases is not the want of actual notice
to the owner, but the lack of an actual possession on the part
of the adverse claimant. It seems, therefore, that the fear of
the courts that a man may be disseised without his knowledge,
is really a fear that he may be disseised by acts which would
.be inoperative to interrupt his possession even if he knew of
them, and insufficient to support the presumption of notice if
20 Roberts v. Richards, 84 Me. 1, 24 Atl. 425 (1891); Whitaker v. Eric
Shooting Club, supra note 12; Adams v. Clapp, 87 Me. 316, 32 Atl. 911
(1895); Worthley v. Burbanks, supra note 12; Brown v. Hartford, 173
Mo. 183, 73 S. W. 140 (1903); Earle Improvement Co. v. Chatfield, 81
Ark. 296, 99 S. W. 84 (1907) ; Norwood v. Mayo, 153 Ark. 620, 241 S. W.
7 (1922).
21 Slater v. Jepherson, 6 Cush. 129 (Mass. 1850); Parker v. Parker,
supra note 9. See also Peoples Savings Bank v. Bufford, supra note 3.
22 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 16.
23 Hapgood v. Burt, 4 Vt. 155 (1832) ; Royall v. Lisle, 15 Ga. 545 (1854);
Whitehead v. Foley, 28 Tex. 268 (1858); Fuentes v. McDonald, 85 Tex.
132, 20 S. W. 43 (1892); Dawson v. Watkins, supra note 7,; Taylor's
Divisees v. Burnsides, Koiner v. Rankin's Heirs, Turpin v. Saunders, Har-
man v. Rafceliff," Citr of Richmond v. Jones, all supra note 8.
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he did not.2
If this analysis be correct, it follows that the lack of actual
notice can hardly have been the sole reason for the unwillingness
of the court to apply the Ewing v. Burnet tests in the principal
case. It is believed, however, that the underlying reason may be
found in the history of the tests themselves.
A study of the origin of the doctrine that the user of land
as far as its character permits and as the owner would use
it, satisfies the requirement of an actual and notorious posses-
sion, will show that before Ewvng v. Burnzet there were very few
statements in cases dealing with adverse possession that could
be said even to suggest such a doctrine. These few occur where
either the possessory acts involved do not appear,21 or the ques-
tion of whether they constituted a possession was not under con-
sideration by the court,2 or the possession was so unequivocal
in character as to afford scant justification for the expressions
used.2 7 The strongest support that could be claimed for the doc-
trine before Ewing v. Burnet will be found in Simpson v.
Blount 28 and Prescott v. Nevers - both of which are concerned
with wild lands of which there was no permanent improvement.
Simpson v. Blount contains the statement that "exercising that
dominion over the thing, taking that use and profit, which it is
capable of yielding in its present state, is a possession. It is
all that can be done until the subject can be changed." In Pres-
cott v. Nevers it was held that wild lands were in the possession
of a claimant who had paid taxes, timbered, and cut hay upon
them, under color of title, such being all the use of which the
land was capable in its then state. The statement taken from
the Simpson case, however, was unnecessary to the decision,3
which was against the party setting up adverse possession; and
2 4 See the wording of the phrase as it appears in Trimble v. Smith, 7
Ky. 257 (1815); Bethum v. Turner, supra note 12; Bailey v. Irby, supra
note 9; Musick v. Barney, 49 Mlo. 458 (1872) ; Gentile v. Kennedy, 8 N. M.
347, 45 Pac. 879 (1896).
2:; Clark v. Lane, 2 N. J. L. 397 (1807).
26 Mercer v. Watson, 1 Watts 330 (Pa. 1833).
27 Tucker v. White, 1 N. J. L. 94 (1791) (building, inclosure, clearing);
Boston Mill Corp. v. Bulfinch, 6 Tyng 229 (Mass. 1810) (building); Bryan
v. Atwater, 3 Day 181 (Coun. 1811) (building and residence), quoted Vith
approval in French v. Pearce, 8 Conn. 439 (1831) (,where the possessory
were under the eye of the owner; Sterling v. Drew, 5 Mart. (N. S.)
203 (La. 1826) (maintaining cemetery); LaFrombois v. Jackon, 8
Cowen 589 (N. Y. 1826) (residence); Melvin v. Proprietors of Locks &
Canals, supra note 12. (building, inclosure, cultivation).
2814 N. C. 34 (1831).
29 Fed. Cas. No. 11390 (C. C. Mle. 1827).
soIn Green v. Harman, 15 N. C. 158 (1833), the court referred to this
dictum as "an exception founded on necessity and so considered at the
time," and added, "it is safest to require an actual occupation, such as
residence or cultivation."
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the decision in the Prescott case was supported on another
ground which was considered sufficient in itself. On the other
hand, the doctrine in question, particularly in its application to
wild lands, has been expressly repudiated a number of times.,'
The actual decision in Ewing v. Burnet 32 will be found to af-
ford the doctrine no more support than the earlier decisions, for
in that case the owner in fact knew of the a t s (taking gravel)
by which it was held the adverse claimant had established his
possession. The requirement of notoriety, being intended for the
purpose of placing the means of knowledge within the owner's
reach, is completely satisfied when the fact of actual knowledge
has been established.3 3 And as notoriety is usually evidenced
by the same facts that go to prove actual possession, the prac-
tical effect of actual notice is to sanction a possession which is
not only less notorious, but also, within limits, less actual than
would otherwise be required.
It is apparent, therefore, that the doctrine under discussion,
which has since been widely accepted, 34 rested originally on a
very slender foundation of adjudicated cases. . Though an-
nounced in most of the states admitted to the Union after the
decision of Ewing v. Burnet, in 1837,31 it has rarely been coun-
31 Bailey v. Irby, supra note 9; White v. Reid, 2 Nott & McC. 534 (S. C.
1820) ; Proprietors of the Kennebec Purchase v. Laboree, 2 Me. 275 (1823);
Jackson v. Warford, 7 Wend. 62 (N. Y. 1831); Smith v. Morrow, Wilson
v. Stivers, both supra note 9.
-2 It is from the language of the Supreme Court in this case that the
doctrine has derived chief impetus.
33 Cook v. Babcock, 11 Cush. 206 (Mass. 1853); McAuliff v. Parxer, 10
Wash. 141 (1894); Burnside v. Doolittle, 24 S. W. (2d) 1011 (Mo. 1930);
McCaughn v. Young, Leavenworth v. Reeves, both supra note 9.
3 See cases comprising the first members of the groups supra note 9,
and cases cited 'upra note 10; also the following: Farley v. Smith, 39
Ala. 38 (1863); Brumagim v. Bradshaw, 39 Cal. 24 (1870); Trask v.
Success Mining Co., 28 Idaho 483, 155 Pac. 288 (1916); Russell v. Mandell,
supra note 18; Johns v. McKibben, 156 Ill. 71, 40 N. E. 449 (1895);
Burns v. Curran, 282 Ill. 476, 118 N. E. 750 (1918); Dyer v. Eldridge,
136 Ind. 654, 36 N. E. 522 (1893); Worthley v. Burbanks, supra note 12;
Tolley v. Thomas, 46 Ind. App. 559, 93 N. E. 181 (1910); Hitt v. Carr,
62 Ind. App. 80, 109 N. E. 456 (1916); Langworthy v. Myers, 4 Iowa 18
(1856); Booth & Graham v. Small & Small, 25 Iowa 177 (1868); Colvin
v. McCune, 39 Iowa 502 (1874); Guinn v. Spillman, 52 Kan. 496, 35 Pac.
13 (1893); Whitaker v. Erie Shooting Club, supra note 12; Sage v. Moro-
sick, 69 Minn. 167, 71 N. W. 930 (1897); Yard v. Ocean Beach Ass'n, 49
N. J. Eq. 306, 24 Atl. 729 (1892); McCaskill v. Pegram Farm & Lumber
Co., 169 N. C. 24, 85 S. E. 39 (1915); Cass v. Richardson, 42 Tenn. 28
(1865); Moran v. Moseley, supra note 11; Merrill v. Tobin, 30 Fed. 738
(C. C. N. D. Iowa 1887); Simmons Creek Coal Co. v. Doran, 142 U. S.
417, 12 Sup. Ct. 239 (1891); Clithero v. Fenner, 122 Wis. 356, 99 N. W.
1027 (1904); of. Town of New Shorham v. Ball, 14 R. I. 566 (1884).
All of the above are concerned with land in the state of nature or in
sparsuly settled regions.
35 See supra note 34.
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tenanced (with the noteworthy exception of North Carolina) 30
in the jurisdictions established before that date. 7 Where the
doctrine has been accepted, the result is not only that there has
been a tendency to relax the requirements for the adverse pos-
session of wild lands to a certain extent, but also that difficulties
have been encountered in its practical application.
The difficulties arise when the acts of the adverse claimant
are few and unlikely to attract attention, and it becomes neces-
sary to press the doctrine toward its logical extreme. Thus.
in a number of cases the courts have been able to hold, without
doing violence to previous pronouncements, that there was no
adverse possession, either because the land was capable of more
complete enjoyment," or because the contrary had not been
shown "; in other cases, nevertheless, where the land was of
practically nQ use, the very courts that have been most ready
to apply the doctrine, have been forced to repudiate it.o
By passing sub silentio over the doctrine evolved from Ewi1
v. Burnet, it is believed that the court in the principal case
properly disregarded a rule which appears unsound when ap-
plied to wild lands. If the language of the decision may be
understood as having reference to the lack of actual possession,
it is believed that it strikes directly at the weakest element in
the plaintiff's case. While frontier conditions existed, the courts
may not have been without justification in adopting a liberal
attitude toward the rules of adverse possession, for the benefit
- With no more foundation than the dictum in Simpson v. Blount, aupra
note 28, a doctrine developed there independently of Ewing v. Burnet, in
substance that taking the ordinary use and profit which land is capable
of yielding in its condition at the time is a sufficient possession to set the
statute of limitations in motion. It has been consistently applied to wild
land cases in North Carolina. Tredwell v. Reddick, 23 N. C. 56 (1840);
Baum v. Currituck Shooting Club, supra note 9; Berry v. McPherson,
153 N. C. 4, 68 S. E. 892 (1910); Coxe v. Carpenter, 157 N. C. 557, 73
S. E. 113 (1911); Locklear v. Savage, 159 N. C. 236, 74 S. E. 347 (1912);
mcCaskill v. Pegram Farm & Lumber Co., supra note 34; Moore v. Curtis,
supra note 10. In other jurisdictions it is occasionally cited in support of
Ewing v. Burnet. See Booth & Graham v. Small & Small, Colvin v. Mc-
Cune, Guinn v. Spillman, all stipra note 34; cf. Dyer v. Eldridge, supra
note 34. The doctrine seems to represent a departure from the traditional
view expressed at an earlier date in Grant v. Winborne, 3 N. C. 56 (1798).
37 Particularly in its application to wild lands, but see Gore v. Todd,
Gunby v. Quinn, Menkens v. Ovenhouse, all supra note 9; Bloodsworth v.
Murray, supra note 10; Yard v. Ocean Beach Ass'n, Cass v. Richardson,
both supra note 34.
38 Loftin v. Cobb, 46 N. C. 406 (1854); Gildehaus v. Whiting, 39 Kan.
706, 18 Pac. 916 (1888).
39 Pullen v. Hopkins, Clarke & Co., 69 Tenn. 741 (1878); Washburn v.
Cutter, 17 Minn. 361 (1871); Ozark Land Co. v. Leonard, 20 Fed. 881
(C. C. E. D. Ark. 1884).
40 Brown v. Rose, Philbin v. Carr, both supra note 9.
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of the settler who had made improvements in good faith." But
frontier conditions have passed. Moreover, the facts of some
of the cases suggest that a liberal policy of this kind would not
infrequently operate in support of dishonest claims, prompted
by the enhancement in value of hitherto unimproved lands.'2
Under such circumstances, there is less excuse for departing
from the strict requirements of the doctrine.
DOES THE SHERMAN ACT PROHIBIT THE ADOPTION
OF STANDARD CONTRACTS AND ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS BY TRADE CONFERENCES?
IT has been said that the law relating to restraints upon trade
is a "branch of the law which has at all times been peculiarly
susceptible to influence from current views of public policy." 1 A
characteristic of recent industrial progress has been a movement
toward (1) standardization, as evidenced by Mr. Hoover's ac-
tivities as Secretary of Commerce; 2 (2) arbitration, as evidenced
by the concurrent efforts of both the National Commissioners on
Uniform Statutes and the American Arbitration Association to
draft and have passed uniform laws for the purpose of giving
efficacy to agreements to submit controversies to arbitration; I
and (3) self-regulation, or the elimination of trade abuses by
concerted action, often, though not invariably, in the form of
trade practice conferences under the auspices of the Federal
Trade Commission.4 Yet a recent decision of the United States
41 See Philbin v. Carr, supra note 9, at 576, 129 N. E. at 25.
42 Clark v. Wilson, 174 Ark. 669, 297 S. W. 1008 (1927); Miller v.
Chicago Mill & Lumber Co., Doctor v. Turner, Andrus v. Hutchinson, all
supra note 1; Hardy Oil Co. v. Burnham, upra note 11.1 Attwood v. Lamont, [1920] 3 K. B. 571, 581.
2 TRADE ASSOCIATION ACTIVITIES (Dep't of Comm. 1927) 3, 4, 108, 109, 114-
115. "The advantages of the standard contract form arise partly from
its inherent fairness both to the owner and to the contractor and from
the workability of its provisions, which reduce disputes and delays to a
minimum, and to the fact that it is well known to architects, builders, and
the public. Neither party has to employ a lawyer to find out whether a
'joker' is hidden somewhere in fine print. The essentials of each contract
can be filled in with a minimum effort." Ibid. 163.
The attitude of the Department of Commerce is shared by the National
Industrial Conference Board. See TRADE ASSOCIATIONS-TiiEIR ECONOmIo
SIGNIFICANCE AND LEGAL STATUS (published by the National Industrial
Confeience Board, 1925) 275-278. And by text-writers as well. Kinsn,
TRADE ASSOCIATIONS-TuE LEGAL ASPECTS (1928) 208.
3 For the text of the two draft statutes, see STURGES, COMMERCIAL AanX-
TRATIONS AN AwARDs (1930) 983, 977. See 'also 47 A. B. A. REP. 295
(1922).
4 DUNN, Tun FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAw (1930) 42-43; HENDERSON, Tum
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1924) 243-244; PUBLIC REGULATION OF COM-
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Supreme Court, Pa'amount Famoous Lasky Corporation v. United
Stautes5 wherein all three devices of standardization, arbitration,
and self-regulation were involved, has placed the stigma of Me-
gality upon each, in granting an injunction against the continued
use of arbitration under the Standard Exhibition Contract in
vogue in the moving picture industry.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly admonished the bar that
"each case arising under the Sherman Act must be determined
upon the particular facts disclosed by the Record, that the opin-
ions in those cases must be read in the light of their facts and of
a clear recognition of the essential differences in the facts of
those cases, and in the facts of any new case to which the rule
of earlier decisions is to be applied." 1 Yet in the Paramount case,
the statement of facts is so meagre, and so barren of reference
to the evils at which the condemned restraint was aimed,r that
it is difficult to assign a limit to the implications of the case, and
well-nigh impossible to render intelligent advice on the legality
of any contemplated similar agreement
The Record discloses that the motion picture industry as
represented by the producers and distributors on the one hand,
and the exhibitors or theatre owners on the other, had been con-
fronted in 1921 with conditions bordering on chaos. This drastic
condition appeared to be due chiefly to (1) the increasing com-
plexity of the necessary terms of contracts for the lease of pic-
tures for exhibition purposes, (2) the somewhat bewildering
diversity of the obligations imposed upon the exhibitors,0 (3)
FrrrrivE PRACTCES (published by the National Industrial Conference Board
1929) 224 et seq.
551 Sup. Ct. 42 (U. S. 1930).
r Mlaple Flooring Manufacturers Ass'n. v. United States, 268 U. S. 563,
579, 45 Sup. Ct. 578, 583 (1925).
7It has generally been deemed relevant, in cases under the Sherman Act,
to inquire whether there was or was not in the agreement assailed as
illegal any "main lawful purpose to subserve which partial restraint is
permitted." United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271, 28"J
(C. C. A. 6th, 1898), modified and affirmed, 175 U. S. 211, 20 Sup. Ct. 9G
(1899).
8 Prof. Beale has observed that "parties contemplating a commercial
dealing consult a lawyer a hundred times in advance of action for every
time they consult him, after the contract is made and broken, to represcnt
them in litigation. What business men need is a rule of law which a
lawyer can give them when they consult him and upon which they can
act with ease and certainty." Beale, What Law Gorcnns the Validity of a
Contract (1910) 23 HARV. L. RMI. 1, 264.
9 It must not be assumed that a motion picture exhibition contract merely
obligates the exhibitor to pay rent. He is required to take care of the film
while in his possession, and to pay for loss or damage according to the
replacement value; if he has contracted for a subsequent "run" of a pic-
ture, he must refrain from advertising it until the first "run," at another
exhibitor's house is completed; he must exhibit the picture at the theater
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the frequency with which breaches were committed and forfeit-
ures declared simply as a result of either (a) failure of the
exhibitors to read and follow instructions for the forwarding
of films or (b) inability to accept and exhibit a film because of
a conflict of play-dates, resulting from the fact that the non-
uniform contracts allowed distributors to fix dates arbitrarily
without covsulting exhibitors. "Dark houses" following hard on
the heels of these disputes caused losses to exhibitors and pro-
ducers. The distributors, seeking to protect themselves from
exhibitors, many of whom held both their theater and their
equipment on lease, and hence were judgment proof, exacted ad-
vance deposits as a protective device. The exhibitors, resent-
ing the stigma upon their collective integrity and protesting
against the added financial burden, suggested arbitration as an
alternative to advance deposits and standardization as a remedy
for breaches of contract which were so often unintentional."
Considerable progress toward the attainment of these aims was
made from 1921 to 1926, and in 1927 it was further facilithted
by the Federal Trade Commissions calling a trade practice con-
ference at which all branches of the industry were represented
and needed modifications in the existing standard contract were
fully and frankly discussed. 1 Paradoxically enough, it was this
standard contract as modified under the auspices of the Federal
Trade Commission which precipitated the Paramount suit by the
Department of Justice, and the decision of Mr. Justice Mc-
Reynolds wherein he seemingly refuses to apply the rule of rea-
son in upholding the Government's contention that the adoption
of the standard contract with the arbitration feature was, de-
spite motive and auspices, an unlawful restraint upon interstate
trade within the meaning of the Sherman Act.
The language of the opinion leaves in doubt just what was
decided in the case. Read in the light of other leading cases
named in the contract and at no other, for an unlawful re-exhibition will
amount to a violation of the copyright law, and may render the distributor
liable to some other exhibitor if the latter has been assured that a picture
contracted for will not be exhibited under circumstances of time and place
likely to impair its value to him; he must forward the film after use to the
next exhibitor entitled to it in time to permit the next exhibition to occur
when scheduled, or if the contract so requires he must return the film to
the distributors' Exchange; and he must adhere to the schedule of play-
dates which has been so arranged by the distributor as to meet the require-
ments of all exhibitors having rights in the film for enjoyment scriatim.
It is this concatenation of rights in a particular film which renders the
prompt settlement of disputes imperative, and which caused the arbitration
features to be adopted as the best means to this end.
10 The appellants' brief points out 29 different provisions in the standard
contract for which the exhibitors were responsible. pp. 40-43.
11 See TRADE PRACTICE CONFERENCES (ed. of July 1, 1929) 83-133; ANN.
REP. FED. TR. CoMMnt. (1929) 6-8.
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under the Sherman Act, the decision, so far from abandoning
permanently the rule of reason, as some observors have been led
to fear,12 probably does nothing more than reflect an individual
prejudice against the rule on the part of the author of the opin-
ion. Indeed it may be that quot hornines tot sententiae has be-
come the only permissible generalization in this field of the law.
If, as seems probable, all the Court intended was to affirm the
action of the lower court ruling the arbitration clause of the
standard exhibition contract illegal, the trade associations have
been subjected to only a temporary set-back. The guarded opin-
ion of the lower court indicated that with the proper machinery,
adequately protecting all interests, arbitration might be estab-
lished in an industry.13 The Court, on the other hand, may have
intended to hold that while standardization, arbitration, and
trade practice conferences are each separately lawful, their com-
bination is not, upon the principle that, mutcttis 2nutandis, a
charge of conspiracy can no more be refuted by "dismember-
ing it and viewing its separate acts" 24 than a faggot can "be
destroyed by taking up each item of conduct separately and
breaking the stick." 11 If the language of Mr. Justice McReyn-
olds be taken literally, it is open to question whether the decision
prohibits only those standard contract clauses embodying compul-
sory arbitration or standard contracts in general. At any rate
the severely practical result of the opinion is that a vast deal of
the constructive work to which trade associations have been de-
voting their energies for the past decade has been jeopardized,
and their opportunities for good seriously impaired as to the
future.
In declaring it to be manifest that the standard form of con-
tract and rules of arbitration adopted by a trade association are
not a "normal and usual agreement in aid of trade and com-
merce" 1; the decision ignores the wide-spread use of standard
See an article by David Lawrence in the New York Evening Sun, Nov.
28, 1930, at 8.
13 United States v. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp., 34 F. (2d) 984, 989
(S. D. N. Y. 1929). It has been pointed out elsewhere that the lack of im-
partiality in the arbitration system established in the movie industry has
been a constant source of complaint on the part of exhibitors. See Comment
(1929) 39 YALE L. J. 884.
14 United States v. Patten, 226 U. S. 525, 544, 33 Sup. Ct. 141, 145 (1913)
' Edwards v. Chile Copper Co., 270 U. S. 452, 455, 46 Sup. Ct. 345,
346 (1926).
16 "The fact that the Standard Exhibition Contract and Rules of Arbi-
tration were evolved after six years of discussion and experimentation does
not show that they were either normal or reasonable regulations. That
the arrangement edsting between the parties cdnnot be classed among
'those normal and usual agreements in aid of trade and commerce' spoken
of in Eastern States Lumber Ass'n v. United States, [234 U. S. 600, 612
34 Sup. Ct. 951, 954 (1914)] is manifest. Certainly it is unusual and we
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contracts by a score of trade associations 17 and the untold num-
ber of contracts which have been cast in the standard mould.
Approximately a million contracts in the movie industry alone "I
are affected by this decision. The producers face not only triple
damage suits for a viplation of the Sherman Act " but possible
repudiation of contractual obligations by the exhibitors on the
ground of illegality. 20 Indeed, even before the decision of the
Supreme Court in the Paramount case, the illegality of the Stand-
ard Exhibition Contract was raised as a defense by an exhibitor
seeking to escape liability for his refusal to accept the number
of pictures which he had agreed to take under such a standard
contract.2' In this case the Federal District Court of Colorado,
basing its decision on the lower court holding in the Paramount
case, took the view that only the arbitration clause was illegal,
and held that, since under the doctrine of divisibility of contract
the arbitration clause might be eliminated from consideration,2'-
its illegality could not serve as a defense to a general action on
the contract. The court held further that the Standard contract
was intrinsically valid and could not be avoided by the incidental
participation of one of the parties in a combination in restraint
of trade. Under this view the producer would be protected
against collateral attack on the contract,23 although still compelled
think it necessarily and directly tends to destroy the kind of competition
to which the public has long looked for protection. United States v.
American Oil Co., [262 U. S. 371, 390 43 Sup. Ct. 607, 611 (1923)]." Para-
mount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, supra note 5, at 45.
S7 Among the trade associations which have adopted standard contracts,
many of which include provision for arbitration, are: Ass'n of American
Wood Pulp Importers, American Spice Trade Ass'n, National Commercial
Fixtures Manufacturers' Ass'n, National Ass'n of Granite Industries, Na-
tional Wholesale Grocers' Ass'n, American Boiler Manufacturers' Ass'n,
Knit Goods Manufacturers' Ass'n, National Wholesale Dry Goods Ass'n,
Linseed Ass'n, National Ass'n of Builders' Exchanges, National Ass'n of
Master Plumbers, National Ass'n of Sheet Metal Contractors of the United
States, National Electrical Contractors' Ass'n of the United States, Na-
tional Ass'n of Marble Dealers, Building Granite Quarries Ass'n, Building
Trades Employers' Ass'n of the City of New York, Actors' Equity Ass'n,
Rubber Exchange of New York, Southern Sash, Door and Millwork Manu-
facturers' Ass'n, Cordage Institute.
18 United States v. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp., supra note 13, at
985.
19 Majestic Theatres Co. v. United Artists Corp., 43 F. (2d) 991 (D.
Conn. 1930).
20 Columbia Pictures Corp. v. Be-Metallic Inv. Co., 42 F. (2d) 873 (D.
Colo. 1930).
21 Ibid.
22 ANSON, CONTRACTS (Corbin's ed. 1919) § 261. "Where you cannot
sever the illegal from the legal part of a covenant the contract is alto.
gether void, but where you can sever them , . . you may reject the bad
part and retain the good."
23 Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540, 22 Sup. Ct. 431
[Vol. 40
1931] COMMENTS
to face a direct attack under the Sherman Act for trade associa-
tion activities. But if it may be inferred from the language of
Mr. Justice McReynolds in the Paraamoun case that the entire
Standard Exhibition Contract is illegal as being in restraint of
trade an avenue is open through which unscrupulous exhibitors
may crawl from under their contractual obligations. "
That the legal limits of concerted action are set so narrowly
comes as a surprise. Relying almost solely on Eastern States Re-
tail Lu-mber Dealers' Ass', v. Uniited States :- i Mr. Justice Mc-
Reynolds ignores the later and more liberal ruling in the Chicago
Board of Trade Case,21 in the Cement Manufacturcrs' Case-"
and in the Maple Flooring case. -8 If the true construction of
the statute is such that its terms are violated by the elimina-
tion through concerted action of unfair or fraudulent trade prac-
tices, to the extent and reprehensibility, even to the existence, of
which the statute compels the court to close its eyes, then the
prompt amendment of that statute becomes an imperative public
necessity. The injury to the public by the adoption of the stand-
ard form of contract by trade associations is, all things con-
sidered, less manifest than the opinion of the Court would have
us believe..29 Surely when a court in effect condemns a device
devoted to trade improvement, upon the ground that the device-
in this case an agreement to offer standard forms of contracts
only --- impairs the freedom to do harm which would otherwise
(1902); Wilder Manufacturing Co. v. Corn Products Refining Co., 236 U.
S. 165, 35 Sup. Ct. 398 (1915); Small Co. v. Lamborn & Co., 267 U. S.
248, 45 Sup. Ct. 300 (1925).
2 Continental Wall Paper Co v. Voight, 212 U. S. 227, 29 Sup. CL 280
(1909).
2u 234 U. S. 600, 34 Sup. Ct. 951 (1914).
26246 U. S. 231, 38 Sup. Ct. 242 (1918). In this case the Court said:
"The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such
as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question
the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which
the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was
imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The
history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting
the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all
relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise
objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because kmowledge of intent
may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences." Ibid.
238, 38 Sup. Ct. at 244.
27 268 U. S. 588, 45 Sup. Ct. 586 (1925).
28 Svpra note 6.
29Supra notes 16 and 17. See LLEWELLYN, THE Emer OF LEGAL INSTI-
TUJTIONS UPON EcoNOcacs (1925) 15 At. ECON. Rsv. 665, 675. "The
standardized contract with arbitration is thus a shining engine of control
for any highly specialized going concern within, and partly independent of
that greater going concern, the state."
-o Standardization is ineffective unless there exist means of maling
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exist, the Court is mistaking shadow for substance and is con-
ferring upon the public an illusory and deceptive benefaction. 1
The logic of Mr. Justice McReynolds' language if followed to
a rigorous conclusion would make the Federal Trade Commission
party to illegal conspiracies and combinations in restraint of
trade. The opinion is devoid of any language affording a basis for
speculation as to how the ends desired by Federal Trade Com-
mission conferences can be attained by lawful means. It might
well prove most satisfactory if Congress were to accord statu-
tory recognition to the trade practice conference, which is at
present an extra-legal institution,32 and either establish a strong
presumption of reasonableness and hence legality in joint action
taken pursuant to such a conference, or give protection to par-
ticipants therein against treble damage suits. The existing
dilemma whereby business men must incur either the hostility
of the Federal Trade Commission if they decline to participate,
or an avalanche of treble damage suits, as well as a criminal
prosecution, if they do participate, is a hardship which should
not be permitted to endure.33
standard fornis prevail, and that can only be done by not contracting with
persons who decline to use them. The Supreme Court having banned the
means, would seem to have outlawed standardization itself as well. The
dictum in its favor in Maple Flooring Manufacturers Ass'n v. United States,
supra note 6, at 582, 45 Sup. Ct. at 584, would seem to be overruled. The
same applies to the observation of Judge Grubb in United States v. Aileen
Coal Co., S. D. N. Y. 1917, charge to the jury (Rec. p. 2300), and of Judge
L. Hand in United States v. Atlantic Terra Cotta, S. D. N. Y., 1921,
in passing sentence (ibid.). As to the legality of standardization under
state laws, see State v. Carondelet Planing Mill Co., 309 Mo. 353, 274
S. W. 780 (1925),; Berensen v. H. G. Vogel Co., 253 Mass. 185, 148 N. E.
450 (1925), certiorari denied, 269 U. S. 577, 46 Sup. Ct. 103 (1926).
31 The Court's finding of a public injury in concerted actions which have
nothing to do with the quality or the price of the product but only with
mechanical details affecting activities behind the scenes, and before the
public's participation began, is hard to sustain.
32 See DUNN, op. cit. supra note 4.
3 It is particularly unfortunate that the opinion in the principal case
fails to mention the Federal Trade Commissions responsibility in the
premises.
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DETERMAINATION OF THE VALIDITY OF MUNICIPAL
ORDINANCES
THE development of the municipal corporation as a unit of gov-
ernment has been marked by a large volume of litigation chiefly
concerned with the relation of the state to its local units in va-
rious overlapping spheres of regulation. The problem of defin-
izg this relation has usually arisen when those who desire to
override a municipal ordinance, in their search for a weapon
with which to attack its validity, have found available state
statutes on the same subject and have sought to establish that
the objectionable ordinance was inconsistent therewith. The
whole issue is thus phrased in terms of a "conflict" of govern-
mental powers 1 and its solution is sought in a determination of
the limits of "power" granted to the municipality by the con-
stitution or legislature of the state. As a result the comparative
effectiveness of the ordinance as a regulatory measure, which
from a practical standpoint ought be determinative of its pro-
priety, is rarely expressly considered.
Two recent cases, although reaching opposite conclusions on
the issue of validity, are equally illustrative of the concealment
behind abstractions of the problem of efficacy in regulation.
In Shelton v. the City of Shelta z an ordinance which made
unlawful within city limits the sale of any milk that was not
pasteurized or obtained from tuberculin-tested cows was held
invalid on the ground that it was in "conflict" with a
state statute which provided for the sale of several other grades
of milk in addition to those permitted by the ordinance. In
Roba, Holding Corporation v. the Mayor of New York 3 an ordi-
nance providing for the levy of tolls upon a proposed bridge
between Manhattan and Queens was opposed on the ground that
according to the accepted law of the state the power to levy
tolls was the prerogative of the sovereign state and could only
be exercised by the legislature. The court held that the ordi-
nance was not in "conflict" with the general law because the
power to levy tolls had been implicitly delegated to the city when
I "The authority of the state is supreme in every part of it, and in all
public undertakings the state is the proprietor. For convenience of local
administration, the state has been divided into municipalities, in each of
which are to be found local officers exercising a certain measure of au-
thority, but in that which they do they are but the agents of the state,
without power to do a single act beyond the boundaries set by the state
acting through its legislature." Ryan v. City of New. York, 177 N. Y.
271, 273, 69 N. E. 599, 600 (1904). Of. State v. Williams, 68 Conn. 131, 25
Atl. 421 (1896); City of Newport v. Horton, 23 R. I. 19G, 47 AtI. 312
(1900); 1 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1911) § 98.
2150 Atl. 811 (Conn. 1930).
3 246 N. Y. Supp. 210 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1930).
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the legislature authorized it, in its charter, to build bridges and
to regulate the use of its streets.
The general rule cited in these cases is that when a "conflict"
exists between an ordinance and an act of the state legislature,
the former must yield 4 unless there is room for concurrent juris-
diction, and that even under these circumitances the ordinance
must be consistent with the general lawY When first promul-
gated this rule undoubtedly provided for effective regulation of
most of the situations which demanded attention, but as the
municipalities developed in importance it became increasingly
apparent that statewide legislation could not deal effectively
with all local problems. Attempts were made to remedy this
deficiency without depriving the legislature of its ultimate reg-
ulatory control. These attempts took the form of a classifica-
tion of cities in terms of the degree of local autonomy, and of
state constitutional amendments directed against specific abuses
in municipal legislation.7 Such means, however, proved inade-
quate and it became necessary to make exceptions to the accepted
general rule.
It was first said that ordinances were valid which were passed
by virtue of specific grants of power conferred upon a munic-
ipality by its charter or by other legislation, even if they were
technically "inconsistent" with state statutes. The category of
these special grants was then extended to include the "police
power" and the "general welfare" clauses of the city charters.
Thus, although the state law provided for the licensing of pool
rooms, an ordinance prohibiting them was held valid because
it was passed under a provision of the charter which authorized
the city to "restrain or prohibit poolrooms." 8 Similarly, ordi-
nances giving ambulances and fire engines traffic preferences
which violated the State Motor Vehicle Act were upheld as
within the valid exercise of the city's police powerY Moreover,
4 Van Buren v. Wells, 53 Ark. 368, 14 S. W. 38 (1890); Town of Liv-
ingston v. Scruggs, 18 Ala. App. 527, 93 So. 224 (1922); Polsky v. Walsh,
220 App. Div. 559, 222 N. Y. Supp. 120 (1st Dep't 1927); Shelton v. City of
Shelton, supra note 2.
5Rossberg v. State, 111 Md. 394, 74 Atl. 581 (1909); Village of Struth-
ers v. Sekol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N. E. 519 (1923); (1927) 15 CALIF.
L. REV. 345. See also cases cited supra note 4.
6 DODD, STATE GOVERNMENT (2d ed. 1928) 392-397.
7 McBAIN, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF 'MUNICIPAL HOME RuLE (1916)
29-63.
8 Corinth v. Crittenden, 94 Miss. 41, 47 So. 525 (1908). Accord: Carey
v. Guest, 78 Mont. 415, 258 Pac. 236 (1927). (traffic regulations); of. City
of Morgansfield v. Walten, 202 Ky. 641, 261 S. W. 12 (1924) (repeal of
grant renders ordinance nugatory).
9 State v. Brown, 142 Md. 27, 119 Atl. 684 (1922). Cf. Eisner Bros. v.




the broad control over municipal affairs , conferred upon cer-
tain cities by the many states which grant "freehold" or "home
rule" charters - was in fact extended by judicial sanction of
specific measures. Thus where a city charter contained a com-
plete scheme for the letting of municipal contracts, provisions
of the state law as to surety bonds were held to be inapplica-
ble,'2 and when a charter conferred upon a city the power
to regulate public utilities, insofar as such regulation was neces-
sary for the enforcement of local police measures, the state
railroad commission was held to be without jurisdiction over
the placing of grade crossings and similar matters.1-
A further elaboration of the general rule has been neces-
sitated in those situations where a statute, though providing
adequate regulation throughout most of the state, is not effec-
tive in dealing with certain local exigencies. 4 Under such cir-
cumstances it has been almost uniformly held that ordinances
are valid which impose regulations and penalties "in addition"
to those provided for by the general law.' a Thus where a state
110 The meaning of "municipal affairs" is, of course, not fixed, but fluc-
tuates with every change in municipal conditions. See Helmer v. Superior
Court, 4S Cal. App. 140, 141, 191 Pac. 1001 (1920). Problems formerly
local rapidly develop to such an extent that they can no longer be effec-
tively regulated by the municipality. For example, a short time ago, the
regulation of traffic on the streets was considered a purely municipal af-
fair, but the expansion of motor traffic and its present wide range have
removed it from the scope of local control and made it imperative that
the regulation thereof be uniform throughout the state. Cf. Ex parte
Daniels, 183 Cal. 636, 192 Pac. 442 (1920); Scheiderman v. Sesanstein,
112 Ohio St. 80, 167 N. E. 158 (1929); McQuLLN, MumciPAL CORPORA-
TIONS (2d ed. 1928) § 683; Comment (1928) 16 CALiF. L. R1EV. 33G.
=Arizona, California, Colorado, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mis-
souri, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsyl-
vania, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin.
Loop Lumber Co. v. Van Loben Sels, 173 Cal. 228, 159 Pac. 600 (1916).
" City of Los Angeles v. Central Trust Co., 173 Cal. 323, 159 Pac. 1169
(1916).
3.4 Such exigencies might well arise where the population is dispropor-
tionately distributed throughout the state. Thus Milwaukee, the only large
city in Wisconsin, is seven times the size of the next largest community
and the people of the state live, for the most part, in towns and villages
of less than twenty-five thousand inhabitants. Further complications from
the point of view of effective city regulations are suggested by the fact
that in 1929 one third of the members of both houses of the legislature
gave their occupations as farmers. See (1929) 18 NimAT. M UN. Rnv. 73T.
15 Standard Chemical Oil Co. v. Troy, 201 Ala. 89, 77 So. 383 (1917);
Lamar & Smith v. Stroud, 5 S. W. (2d) 324 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) (street
crossing); Flynn v. Bledsoe Co., 92 Cal. App. 145, 267 Pac. 887 (1928)
(parking); Ex parte Iverson, 199 Cal. 582, 250 Pac. 681 (1920) (liquor
prescriptions under the prohibition law); Keats v. Board of Police Com-
missioners of Providence, 42 R. I. 240, 107 AtI. 74 (1919) (provision for
punishment of police officers on conviction of crime by "reprimand, for-
feiture of pay, reduction in rank, or dismissal from force" held consistent
1931]
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Motor Vehicle Act provided that automobiles should be operated
with reasonable care while passing street cars, an ordinance
was upheld which required all automobiles to be stopped within
ten feet of the rear of the street car.e The scope of this qualifi-
cation has usually, however, been limited 17 by the requirement
that additional regulations must be "consistent" with the policy
of the statute."' Thus the "additional regulation" doctrine
did not save the ordinance involved in the Shelton case; 1 yet it
has been held that, despite a statute requiring only that all milk
be pasteurized, a city may demand that all milk sold within its
limits must be pasteurized therein.20  Moreover, the require-
ment of consistency has been enforced at the expense of a local
ordinance when it was apparent that the general intention of
the legislature was opposed to that of the municipal corporation,
even though the statute was silent on the particular point men-
tioned in the ordinance.21 Yet some courts have held that the
with statute prohibiting ordinances from imposing any penalty on acts
punishable as crimes). Contra: State v. Eubanks, 154 N. C. 628, 70
S. E. 466 (1911) (fire inspection). But cf. State v. Frederic, 28 Idaho
709, 155 Pac. 977 (1916).
'1 Mann v. Scott, 180 Cal. 550, 182 Pac. 281 (1919).
17 Even ordinances which provide for less stringent regulation and im-
pose lesser penalties than statutes are often held valid. Here again the
way in which the courts approach the problem involves them in unneces-
sarily intricate reasoning. They hold that the lower standards set up by
the ordinance do not constitute a conflict with the statute, nor are they an
invitation to disregard its more exacting standards, because they are
merely indicative of an intention on the part of the city to be responsible
only for the enforcement of those standards which it deems necessary,
and in no way inhibit the legislature from going further should it desire
to do so. St. Louis v. de Lassus, 205 Mo. 578, 104 S. W. 12 (1907); St.
Louis v. Scheer, 235 Mo. 721, 139 S. W. 434 (1911); Adler v, Martini,
179 Ala. 97, 59 So. 597 (1912). Of. Malette v. City of Spokane, '77 Wash.
205, 137 Pac. 496 (1913) (ordinance prescribing same regulations as
statute held valid).
Is Chicago v. Union Ice Cream Mfg. Co., 252 Ill. 311, 96 N. E. 872
(1911); Milwaukee v. Childs Co., 195 Wis. 148, 217 N. W. 703 (1928).
Even when the purpose of the ordinance and of the statute is clearly the
same, a technical divergence such as a variation in the method of obtain-
ing a license will sometimes be held to constitute a "conflict." St. Louis v.
Tielkemeyer, 226 Mo. 130, 125 S. W. 1123 (1910).
19 Cf. Town of Randolph v. Gee, 199 Iowa 181, 201 N. W. 567 (1925).
20 Witt v. Klimm, 97 Cal. App. 131, 274 Pac. 1039 (1929).
21 City of Baton Rouge v. Weis, 141 La. 99, 74 So. 709 (1917). Contra:
Village of Struthers v. Sokol, supra note 5. Where a city was granted
express power to pass inspection ordinances, an ordinance which imposed
a duty on the receiver of intoxicating liquor to offer it for inspection and
pay a fee thereon was held inconsistent with the state prohibition statute
forbidding the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors but allow-
ing the possession of small quantities for social purposes. The ground
of the decision was that the charter authority to pass inspection ordinances
was intended to apply only to those passed to ensure quality of product
for the consumer. Wood v. Markstein, 196 Ala. 209, 72 So. 41 (1916).
only way in which the legislature can prohibit city ordinances
in any field of regulation is to occupy that field so completely
by its own laws that there remains no further room for legis-
lation therein.22
It would appear, therefore, that the force of the general rule
as to "conflict" has been materially weakened by the qualifica-
tions to which it has been subjected and the variance in their
interpretation. Attempts to define "conflict" have revealed the
completely academic nature of the term. It has been said that
there is no "conflict" unless one law grants authority to do an
act which another law forbids 2 and, again, that the test is
whether one law can be violated without infringing the other. 2
These definitions are of little value, since their terms have been
satisfied in many cases in which "conflict" has been held not to
exist. This is true of most cases in which ordinances have set
up traffic regulations which authorize violations of the State
Motor Vehicle Act. An ordinance has even been held valid
which prohibited the sale of fire-arms by pawnbrokers despite
a statute which expressly provided for the licensing of such
sales.
Any attempt at the construction of a new rule to serve as a
basis for prediction must prove futile if founded merely upon
a categorical exegesis of the cases. But an examination of the
subject from the point of view of the purpose for which "con-
flicting" legislation has been passed, namely, to secure effective
regulation, discloses a certain uniformity of result. It usually
becomes apparent that if the ordinance is the more efficient reg-
ulatory measure, no "conflict" is found; whereas, if the statute
is more likely to function effectively, a "conflict" will be de-
clared to exist. In the Robic case, for example, in which two
judges dissented, both opinions apply the general rule, the mi-
nority finding a "conflict" and the majority finding none. The
majority cites no authority and from a purely legal standpoint
has much the weaker argument. Yet granting the desirability
of a bridge between the boroughs of Manhattan and Queens and
the unliklihood that any agency other than the City of New
York would attempt its construction, and recognizing that under
the provisions of the Greater New York Charter the securities
necessary to finance such a work can not be issued unless the
22 In re Mingo, 190 Cal. 769, 214 Pac. 850 (1923). For example, when
a state indicates its intention completely to abolish a given practice, the
field of legislation on that subject has been held to be so fully occupied
by the state that the city is powerless to pass upon it, even to facilitate
the suppression of the practice which is proscribed. In re Simmons, 71
Cal. App. 522, 235 Pac. 1029 (1923).
2 Village of Struthers v. Sokol, 9zipra note 5, at 268, 140 N. E. at 521.
424 City of Crawfordsville v. Jackson, 170 N. E. 850, 851 (Ind. 1930).
25 Elsner Bros. v. Hawkins, supra note 9.
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bridge be revenue-producing, it would seem that the ordinance
was well adapted to accomplish its purpose. That considerations
such as these, although unexpressed, should not have exerted
considerable influence upon the actual decision, seems incon-
ceivable.
In the field of public utility control, however, it is felt that
effective regulation can best be accomplished by the state. Here,
the courts have held that city charters are subject to control by
the lgislature.6 The abolition of a franchise granted to a mu-
nicipality, in order to make way for a utility incorporated by
the state, was early allowed,27 and after the creation of public
service commissions these bodies also were in many cases per-
mitted to alter the provisions of municipal franchises) 8
In all these cases the courts have continued to obscure the
main issue by speaking in terms of "powers" and of "conflict." 21
Even though their decisions may reflect an awareness of issues
more practical than conceptual the written emphasis of their
opinions has persistently tended to minimize the really signifi-
cant factors of the controversies. For the question is not how
to reconcile the conflicting demands of two separate agencies
of government; it is the more practical problem of how best to
serve the public interest by means of the most effective regula-
tion o
26 People v. Mayor of New York, 32 Barb. 102 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1860).
27East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., 10 How. 511 (U. S. 1850);
cf. City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U. S. 182, 43 Sup. Ct. 534 (1923).
28 See Southern Utilities Co. v. City of Palatka, 268 U. S. 232, 233, 45
Sup. Ct. 488 (1925).
29 The courts in public utility cases do not rely so directly upon the gen-
eral rule as to "conflict," although in one case a court escaped finding
a "conflict" by holding that the subsequent creation of a Public Service
Commission was within the purview of a condition in the franchise granted
by the city that the company's rules should always be consistent with
state laws. Puget Sound Traction, Light, & Power Co. v. Reynolds, 244
U. S. 574, 37 Sup. Ct. 705 (1917). They base these decisions upon tech-
nical reasoning as to withdrawal of agency, a criticism of which may be
found in Richard J. Smith, The Judicial Interpretation of Public Utititj
Franchises (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 957, 970-972. There is somewhat more
justification here for the use of purely legal concepts than there is in
most of the cases involving technical "conflict" because of the serious
question of the constitutional provision against the impairment of contract
rights which is inseparable from any attempt at alteration of a franchise
by the state legislature. Yet in discussing such a constitutional question
it would be desirable to have a straightforward approach from the view-
point of expediency comparable to that of Mr. Chief Justice Taft in
Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456, 44 Sup. Ct. 169
(1924).
30 A study of the cases in which the courts find a technical conflict when
the ordinance, though efficient as a regulatory measure, is manifestly
unreasonable, would prove of interest.
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